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This book examines the treatment of irregular migration, 
trafficking and smuggling of human beings in EU law and 
policy. What are the policy dilemmas encountered in efforts to 
criminalise irregular migration and humanitarian assistance to 
irregular immigrants ? The various contributions in this edited 
volume examine the principal considerations that make up EU 
policies directed towards irregular migration and its relationship 
with trafficking and smuggling of human beings. This book aims 
to provide academic input to informed policy-making in the next 
phase of the European Agenda on Migration.
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FOREWORD 
hile the current migration and refugee crisis is the most severe that 
the world has known since the end of the Second World War (with 
over 60 million refugees worldwide, according to the UNHCR), it 
may turn into the norm, because the reasons to migrate keep on multiplying. 
These reasons range from long-lasting political crises, endemic civil wars, 
atrocities committed against ethnic or religious groups by extremist 
organisations to the lack of economic development prospects and climate 
change. The European Union has a duty to welcome some of these people – 
namely those who need international protection.  
With over a million irregular migrants crossing its external borders in 
2015, the European Union has to engage in a deep reflection on the rationale 
underpinning its policies on irregular migration and migrant smuggling – 
and their effects. At such a strenuous time, the challenge before us is “to 
work closely together in a spirit of solidarity” while the “need to secure 
Europe’s borders” remains an imperative, to recall President Juncker’s 
words.  
Of particular relevance in this framework is the issue of migrant 
smuggling, or facilitation of irregular entry, stay or transit. Addressing 
migrant smuggling – located at the intersection of criminal law, which 
sanctions organised crime, the management of migration and the protection 
of the fundamental rights of irregular migrants – has become a pressing 
priority. But the prevention of and fight against migrant smuggling is a 
complex process, affected by contextual factors, including a high level of 
economic and social disparity between the EU and several third countries, 
difficult cooperation with source and transit countries and limited legal 
migration channels to the EU.  
In this framework, the European Commission tabled two agendas 
prioritising the fight against migrant smuggling. The European Agenda on 
Security, adopted in April 2015, and the European Agenda on Migration, 
presented in May 2015, both attach major importance to cooperation against 
W 
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the smuggling of migrants inside the EU and from third countries. Shortly 
afterwards, to operationalise these frameworks, the European Commission 
presented the EU Action Plan against Migrant Smuggling, in May 2015. It 
foresees a comprehensive, multidisciplinary response against migrant 
smuggling involving relevant stakeholders and institutions at all levels.  
The Action Plan covers all phases and types of migrant smuggling and 
all migratory routes, including the facilitation of secondary movement, 
unauthorised residence within the EU and the necessity to enforce return 
and readmission procedures. It endorses a comprehensive approach ranging 
from preventive action targeting potential migrants in countries of origin 
and transit to measures against smuggling rings operating along the 
migratory routes, while ensuring the full respect of the human rights of 
migrants. The implementation, involving different actors and organisations 
at local, regional, national and international levels, as well as EU agencies, is 
coordinated by the Commission. The Action Plan sets out both short-term 
and long-term objectives around four main priorities: reinforcing 
investigation and prosecution of smugglers; improved information 
gathering, sharing and analysis; better prevention of smuggling and 
assisting vulnerable migrants and enhancing cooperation with third 
countries.  
The Action Plan underlines the critical need to collect and share 
information on the modus operandi, routes and economic models of 
smuggling networks in order to understand the business model of criminal 
networks and design adequate responses. In this framework, full use should 
be made of the available risk analyses and monitoring of pre-frontier areas. 
The dissemination of information related to the external borders will be 
increased with the support of Eurosur, while further research on the 
phenomena and on the links with other crimes needs to be initiated. 
The relevant EU agencies must scale up their work on migrant 
smuggling. Their resources devoted to migrant smuggling have been 
increased substantially. Europol’s new European Migrant Smuggling Centre 
should become the EU information hub in the fight against migrant 
smuggling. The presence of both Europol and Frontex in the hotspots of 
frontline member states is crucial for gathering and processing information 
– and for launching investigations leading to prosecutions. 
Funded by the European Commission’s Seventh Framework 
Programme for Research, the FIDUCIA project has promoted research on the 
role of trust-based policies in legal compliance in the field of migration, 
through the work done by the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) 
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and a group of academics. The initiative aims to stimulate evidence-based 
policy-making and to bring fresh thinking to develop more effective policies. 
The European Commission welcomes the valuable contribution of this 
initiative to help close the wide gap in our knowledge about the smuggling 
of migrants, and especially the functioning of smuggling networks.  
Facilitation of irregular migration constitutes a serious challenge with 
respect to three central questions, as reflected in this book.  
First, if the choice to criminalise migrant smuggling constitutes an 
unwavering commitment of the European Union and its member states 
(deep-rooted in international law by the Protocol against the Smuggling of 
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, which the European 
Union approved), the effectiveness of the repression of smuggling networks 
is unconvincing. At present, the overall number of investigations and 
prosecutions leading to effective convictions of migrant smugglers across the 
entire European Union is low, compared to the estimated overall scale of the 
phenomenon.  
At the same time, the demand for smugglers’ services by potential 
migrants and seekers of international protection is on the rise and so are the 
instances of exploitation and human rights violations reported by migrants. 
This situation affects the safety and security of migrants and EU citizens 
alike. It has an effect on business operators in sectors such as the fishing and 
shipping industries, the air and land transport sectors, civil society and other 
organisations working in the field of migration and asylum. The reasons are 
numerous: the nature of the crime itself, the context, the unprecedented 
demand, the difficulty of following the financial trails and the challenge of 
cooperating with third-country authorities.  
Specific dynamics, such as the use of cash payments or informal 
banking systems (such as the hawala method) and the transnational aspects 
of smuggling make it hard to investigate criminal proceeds. Nevertheless, 
proactive financial investigations to identify, seize and recover criminal 
assets and counter money laundering are crucial – all the more so because 
smugglers are sometimes involved in other criminal areas, e.g. smuggling of 
cigarettes, trafficking in drugs and weapons and labour exploitation in order 
to support their smuggling activity or to boost their profit.  
Law enforcement and judicial authorities in all member states must 
have better capacities to investigate and prosecute financial cases, as 
smuggling of migrants is a transnational crime, which cannot be effectively 
addressed without a cross-border police and judicial response. Stronger 
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cooperation at the EU level and beyond, including with third countries of 
origin and transit, other strategic partners and international organisations is 
an essential prerequisite to successfully preventing and countering migrant 
smuggling. In this respect, the cooperation within the EMPACT (European 
Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats), the Operational 
Action Plan on irregular immigration should be strengthened. Europol, in 
cooperation with other relevant EU agencies and international bodies, is 
ready to provide support to member states in financial investigations, money 
laundering and asset recovery techniques as well as actions against 
organised criminal groups and individuals. Targeting smugglers’ profits 
should become a priority for the National Assets Recovery Offices and the 
Camden Assets Recovery Inter-Agency Network.       
Second, protecting the fundamental rights of irregular migrants 
requires differentiating between smugglers and those providing 
humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants, as this research points out. 
This is particularly true as civil society – NGOs as well as individuals – are 
often the ones that cover the basic needs of migrants.  
At a time when states are overwhelmed, it is paramount to ensure that 
those helping receive migrants are given the legal certainty that they will not 
be prosecuted for their assistance. The Commission will look into this 
carefully when it will make proposals for the revision of the EU legislation 
on migrant smuggling. Along the same lines, I would like to stress that the 
priorities of the Commission in addressing migrant smuggling are 
exclusively targeted against those profiting from the desperation of migrants 
– and not against the migrants themselves.  
Third, the interrelationship between migrant smuggling and 
trafficking in human beings is a complex issue to tackle. The risk of falling 
victim to trafficking after or during the course of the sometimes very long 
smuggling process is very real. This is particularly true for the most 
vulnerable groups such as children, especially unaccompanied minors, and 
women travelling alone or with young children.   
Accounts of fatalities among those embarking on these perilous 
journeys have sadly become a regular feature of the daily news, while 
testimonies accounting for inhuman and degrading treatment have 
multiplied. Hence, there is a clear need for targeted information campaigns 
and the development of a counter-narrative to uncover the deceptions of 
smugglers. Informing prospective migrants about the dangers of engaging 
in irregular migration to the EU is important for preventing them from 
boarding the boats and thus protecting the lives of those who are seeking to 
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reach Europe at any price. Establishing partnerships with business operators 
in the sectors most at risk, notably through the development of handbooks 
for the transport sector, as well as guidelines for border authorities, is equally 
important for preventing migrant smuggling.   
But taking action to prevent or counter migrant smuggling must be 
seen in connection with the EU’s broader efforts to open more legal and safe 
migration channels, for instance through resettlement or legal migration 
schemes, with its determined action to save lives at sea and with action to 
address the root causes of migration in the countries of origin and transit. 
The Commission is committed to implementing fully the European Agenda 
on Migration, which envisages strong action on all aspects relevant for a 
comprehensive and sustainable migration policy. 
 
Matthias Ruete 
Director General 
DG Home Affairs 
European Commission 
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ADDRESSING IRREGULAR MIGRATION, 
FACILITATION AND HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING: THE EU’S APPROACH 
SERGIO CARRERA AND ELSPETH GUILD 
ver the last 15 years, the European Union has seen its role and legal 
competence increasing in the enactment of common legislation and 
instruments providing for common European standards, procedures 
and conditions for the treatment of third-country nationals irregularly 
entering or staying in the Union’s territory, as well as those in solidarity with 
them.  
In this book we examine the measures adopted and claims made at the 
EU level about the nature, importance and possible threat that irregular 
migration constitutes for the EU. A wide range of EU legislative measures 
have been adopted, which have obliged member states to take action against 
irregular migrants and anyone who may be found to assist them. This book 
examines the issue of irregular migration in the EU. It provides new 
perspectives and policy directions with the aim of assisting policy-makers 
who seek to address this complex and politically charged field.  
The European Commission launched its plan and priorities for a “New 
Comprehensive European Agenda on Migration” on 4 March 2015.1 The 
Commission has expressed its wish to enhance actions “in fighting irregular 
immigration and smuggling more robustly”. This Agenda was 
complemented by the EU Action Plan against Migrant Smuggling in May 
2015. 
This has run in parallel with an incremental use of criminal or penal 
law-like sanctions in the EU against individuals directly or indirectly 
involved in the irregular immigration process, including EU citizens, 
                                                     
1 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4545_en.htm. 
O 
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regularly resident third-country nationals, and ‘third parties’ engaged in 
helping and/or providing humanitarian assistance to undocumented 
people, which has been identified as ‘criminalisation’ of irregular migration 
and solidarity. In autumn 2015, during which substantial numbers of 
refugees in desperate situations left Turkey and travelled through both EU 
and Schengen states – some of them passing into western Balkan states and 
back into EU states – the EU’s measures against facilitation of irregular 
migration were instrumentalised by some political leaders to warn their 
citizens and the citizens of neighbouring states against assisting refugees on 
the move.  
This has presented new challenges to the EU’s measures and raised the 
question of whether they are well adjusted to the needs of our times. 
Certainly, the plight of refugees in dreadful situations has inspired many 
people in the region to reach out to assist and help them both on their routes 
and on arrival at their destinations. Many of these actions could, under the 
national implementing rules of the EU measures against irregular migration, 
be treated as crimes, and EU citizens’ acts of solidarity with refugees in need 
could be deemed as civil disobedience in defiance of the law.  
This book will examine the state of the law and practice in this highly 
charged field. First, however, we need to examine the state of our knowledge 
about irregular migration into the EU. What do the numbers tell us about the 
scale of the phenomenon in the EU? What do attempts to count irregular 
immigrants assume wrongly? 
One of the most controversial aspects of any discussion of irregular 
migration is the matter of numbers.2 One of the most commonly cited studies 
on irregular migration is that of the EU-funded project CLANDESTINO 
which examined and estimated the ‘irregular’ population in 12 member 
states, suggesting a total of between 5-8 million irregularly present migrants 
in the EU and 500,000 arriving each year.3  
This so-called estimate is still produced regularly to justify the need for 
more measures against irregular migration into the EU. It also fuels calls for 
further criminalisation of irregular migration to ‘deal’ with what is presented 
as a problem because of the size. Three issues are readily apparent regarding 
the purported figure: 
                                                     
2 The question of ‘the scale of irregular immigration’ in the EU outlined in this 
introductory chapter is based on Carrera et al. (2015). 
3 Clandestino (2009). 
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1. There is an assumption that irregularity is a sort of existential category 
and thus can be counted independently of actions of states to treat 
specific individuals as irregularly present. 
2. The highly fluid nature of the entry and departure of third-country 
nationals into and out of the EU is ignored in favour of a vision of the 
EU as a one-way street – into the EU but not out. 
3. The evidence of the EU immigration and border authorities themselves 
on the numbers of persons treated as irregularly present is dismissed 
as inaccurate in favour of some existential figure to which only the 
researchers have access and knowledge. 
In respect of the first assumption, third-country nationals only 
irregularly enter or are only irregularly present in the EU in so far as and 
where state authorities determine that they are so. There is nothing 
existential about irregularity.  
Some simple examples to demonstrate the issue: there is a specific 
annex to the Schengen Borders Code (SBC) which provides for a variety of 
persons who enter the EU without passing through immigration control to 
be regularly present, including pleasure craft arriving at ports and a variety 
of others. A wide range of EU visa waiver agreements on border traffic with 
neighbouring countries (mainly those with which there are very highly 
levels of border crossing) permit nationals of the third state to enter under a 
simplified regime which takes priority over the Schengen rules, including 
those regarding length and frequency of stay. Many member states have 
bilateral agreements with numerous third countries which permit entry and 
residence for longer periods than the Schengen rules’ 90 days, with no 
formalities at all.  
Other examples are equally mundane: for instance the third-country 
national student in the EU who is permitted to work 20 hours a week during 
term time and whose employer requests an extra few hours one week will 
become an ‘irregularly’ present third-country national for that one week and 
then, when his or her hours drop back to 20 or below, cease to be irregularly 
present. The third-country national family member of a citizen who misses 
the deadline for filing his or her residence permit application by a few days 
or weeks and files it late has become ‘irregularly’ present in the member 
state, but whether this will be detrimental depends on whether the 
immigration authorities choose to treat that period as ‘irregular’. In many 
member states immigration ministries actually follow general rules of thumb 
regarding periods of ‘irregularity’, resulting in their being overlooked.  
4  CARRERA & GUILD 
 
The point here is that the label of ‘irregularity’ can never be determined 
independently of the activities of the immigration and border guards. It is 
only this exercise of sovereign power which categorises someone as 
irregularly present (or not).  
Frontex (the EU External Borders Agency) recently published a report 
confirming that over 700 million exits and entries into and out of the EU take 
place each year (into and out of an EU which is comprised of 507 million 
residents).4 Each border guard has approximately 12 seconds to decide on 
the entry of a person into the EU according to Frontex. The consequence of 
taking longer is the unacceptable disruption of traffic flows at airports, roads 
and other entry points in the EU. The decision of the border guard in those 
12 seconds that the traveller is ‘regular’ or ‘irregular’ is about as profound as 
the decision of a ticket inspector on the metro. All of the legal definitions 
contained in the Schengen Borders Code for entry into the EU, including the 
need to probe the purpose of the visit, the adequacy of the individual’s 
status, his or her background and funds, is a valuable starting point but fairly 
removed from actual practice. So long as the border guard does not actually 
challenge the person as seeking to enter irregularly, the person enters 
regularly irrespective of his or her intentions or motives.  
One of the most revealing documents which demonstrates this fact of 
border control is the information manual produced by the (US) CIA for its 
intelligence operatives travelling under false identities on how to cross the 
Schengen external border without being apprehended (made public by 
WikiLeaks).5 All persons using this advice will, according to the existential 
view of border controls, be ‘irregularly’ present, although they will have 
been admitted by a border guard according to the Schengen Handbook and 
undoubtedly will leave before the end of their 90-day Schengen visit. These 
realities of border crossing and their control by EU border guards make a 
mockery of certain claims to existential knowledge of how many people are 
irregularly present in the EU. The idea that such estimates can exist beyond 
and independent of the actions of immigration and border guards to treat 
certain persons as irregularly present is the fundamental error.  
If one then moves to the available official data from border and 
immigration authorities regarding irregular entry and residence in the EU, 
an exceedingly different picture emerges. Let us take simply the latest report 
                                                     
4 Frontex (2014). 
5 Wikileaks (2014). 
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of Frontex – the FRAN Quarterly Q3 2015 on the management of EU external 
borders (including Denmark, Ireland and the UK).6 Table 1 indicates that in 
the third quarter of 2015 at all EU borders 617,412 persons attempted an 
illegal border crossing between border crossing points. Of this number 
308,165 were Syrian nationals (who undoubtedly requested asylum, so their 
inclusion under irregular entry means that they will be counted twice in the 
statistics). The next highest numbers by nationality were Afghans (92,216) 
and Iraqis (23,799). Some 91,065 such entries were by persons whose 
nationality was not specified (but likely to be from these same countries of 
origin and without passports). If those persons irregularly entering the EU 
(mainly by sea) who are highly likely also to apply for asylum were excluded 
from this first figure, and leaving aside the fact that many people may have 
been counted twice as they entered, for instance, Greece by sea from Turkey, 
then left via Macedonia only to re-enter via Hungary and thus be counted at 
least twice, then the figure would be 102,901, lower than that of Q3 2014 
(112,901).  
Two things are worth noting about these figures. The first is their claim 
to accuracy. Frontex claims to know down to the last individual how many 
persons were detected seeking to cross irregularly the external border of the 
EU. Of course the border guards may miss some people, but between the 
individual border guard on the beat and the Frontex statistics, there is a claim 
of absolute coherence, knowledge and consistency. Frontex prepares 
statistics which claim a very high degree of accuracy. These are not 
guestimates.  
Frontex also provides in its FRAN Q3 2015 the number of persons who 
were treated as irregularly present in the EU in Q3: 265,166. Again the top 
nationality was Syrian (89,356) followed by Afghan (37,772) and Iraqi 
(32,342). These are also the most frequent nationalities among persons 
seeking and receiving international protection in the EU. Although these 
people have been treated as (temporarily) irregular as they crossed EU 
internal borders to arrive in the member state where they wished to make 
their asylum claim, it may be expected that upon arrival they would receive 
international protection.  
The inclusion of prima facie in these figures of ‘illegally’ staying people 
is something of an ethical travesty for the EU. Leaving ethics aside, however, 
Frontex once again makes a very serious claim to knowledge and accuracy 
                                                     
6 Frontex (2015). 
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and that claim has nothing to do with millions of ‘irregulars’ – indeed, it is 
difficult to square with claims of millions.  
The problem which the Frontex figures elucidate is one of scale. The 
fear of irregular (in the language of the EU illegal – a term now specifically 
condemned by Resolution 2059 (2015) of 22 May 2015 of the Council of 
Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly) migrants is based on guesses which tend 
to assume an external reality separate from that of the co-constitution of 
irregularity which requires the active participation of the immigration 
authorities. In fact, irregularity of entry and residence is exclusively co-
constituted by individuals and border and immigration authorities entering 
into very specific kinds of exchanges which result in the application of the 
designations. They exist nowhere else – there is no ‘reality’ out there of 
irregularly present people beyond those whom the immigration and border 
authorities themselves have specifically designated one-by-one as 
irregularly entering or present.  
Both those irregularly present and the authorities that have designated 
them as such are intimately connected – they know one another well, the 
authorities often know well where those they have categorised as irregularly 
present are, and those who have been so categorised for the most part are 
busy making various consecutive applications (such as for asylum) to escape 
this designation. The possibility of designating third-country nationals as 
irregularly present is inherent in the power of state legislatures to change 
immigration laws and rules and to make unlawful the entry and residence 
of people on grounds which those legislatures choose. The state can also 
reduce irregularity of entry and residence by adapting laws and regulations 
to accommodate third-country nationals’ preferences (an example of this is, 
for instance, the reduction of states which are on the EU’s mandatory visa 
list, thus eliminating the possibility that their citizens can be treated as illegal 
migrants for entering the EU without a visa). 
This reality, notwithstanding its apparent inconsistency with popular 
‘knowledge’, is strongly supported by Frontex’s figures on return decisions 
(Tables 12 and 13 FRAN Q3 2015). In Q 3 2015, in the whole of the EU, 73,363 
return decisions were taken. This is quite obviously a very different figure 
from the number which Frontex provided us with of persons irregularly 
entering the EU (617,412) or irregularly staying (265,166) over the same 
period. Clearly, the discrepancy is the result of claims for international 
protection and other claims for residence.  
However, one might well take the figure of 73,363 as a much more 
realistic number of the persons whom the EU border and immigration 
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authorities really want to get rid of as irregularly present. That figure, 
however, is actually much lower when we consult the number of effective 
returns carried out in Q3 2015 – 43,965. Of the initial 73,363 people whom the 
border and immigration authorities identified as people they no longer want 
on the territory, in fact, and on closer examination of the specifics of each 
case, only 43,965 were actually sent away, while the others continue to stay 
in the EU. 
The EU debate on irregularly present third-country nationals urgently 
needs to become more mature and to be informed by the data which the 
border and immigration authorities make available. However, the stake in 
such a change of perspective is enormous – if the realities of irregularly 
staying third-country nationals in the EU are so minor, how can one justify 
the huge political, legal and economic investment in ‘resolving’ something 
which is barely a problem at all?  
It is within this context that this book examines issues related to 
irregular migration and EU law and policy. Special attention is paid to the 
determinants and challenges that make up policies directed towards 
irregular migration and human trafficking in the EU with a view to 
providing academic input for informed policy-making in the next phases of 
European migration policies. The volume is based on a closed-door Expert 
Seminar that took place at CEPS on 24-25 March 2015, co-organised with the 
Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME) of the 
European Commission, and which brought together a high-level group of 
European Commission officials representing relevant DGs and services 
dealing with migration-related policies (see the Annex for the full 
programme of the Expert Seminar).  
The seminar brought together Commission officials and a 
multidisciplinary selection of academics who presented their research 
findings in relation to the following three thematic challenges: first, 
facilitation of irregular migration; second, humanitarian assistance to 
irregular migrants; and third, the interrelationship of human trafficking with 
other forms of irregular migration. The event was structured around these 
three challenges, which in turn dealt with the following set of sub-questions: 
 Challenge 1: The Criminalisation of Facilitating Irregular Entry and Stay: 
Have the 2002/90/EC Directive on the facilitation of unauthorised 
entry, transit and residence (Facilitation Directive) and Framework 
Decision implementing it been effective in addressing the smuggling 
of migrants? What has been the impact of the Employer Sanctions 
Directive in addressing irregular migration? Are there alternative 
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ways of managing irregular migration other than through 
strengthening the penal framework? 
 Challenge 2: Humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants: What is the 
impact of the Facilitation Directive on irregular migrants? Should the 
Facilitation Directive clarify the extent of criminal liability for assisting 
irregular migrants? What are the priorities of the EU in addressing 
facilitation of irregular entry and stay? Is criminal law the most 
effective means to address the phenomenon of facilitating irregular 
migration? 
 Challenge 3: The interrelationship of trafficking in human beings and with 
other forms of irregular migration. What is the interrelationship between 
trafficking in human beings and other forms of irregular migration? 
What knowledge gaps need to be filled when exploring the links 
between human smuggling and trafficking in human beings? Are there 
alternative ways of addressing human trafficking other than through 
strengthening the penal framework? 
The Expert Seminar fell within the framework of FIDUCIA (New 
European Crimes and Trust-based Policy), a research project financed by the 
European Commission, under the Seventh Framework Programme in which 
CEPS was a partner. The editors would like to express their gratitude to the 
DG HOME of the Commission for co-organising the Expert Seminar which 
constituted the basis of this book. They would also like to thank all the 
participants in the event and the contributors to this volume. Special thanks 
go to Stefano Maffei, Coordinator of the FIDUCIA project and Lecturer in 
Law at the University of Parma, and Cristina Marcuzzo (scientific officer 
responsible for the FIDUCIA project in DG Research and Innovation of the 
Commission) for their cooperation and support throughout the FIDUCIA 
project. The editors are very grateful to Mark Provera (Jesuit Refugee Service 
(JRS) and former Researcher at CEPS) for his most valuable inputs in the 
organisation of the Expert Seminar and active contribution in the first steps 
towards the preparation of this book.  
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 MIGRANT SMUGGLING IN THE EU: 
WHAT DO THE FACTS TELL US? 
SERGIO CARRERA AND ELSPETH GUILD 
n 23 April 2015, the European Commissioner for Migration, Home 
Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris Avramopoulos, and the EU 
Council expressed their determination to come to grips with people 
smuggling in the Mediterranean. The Commissioner stated in his press 
release of that date: “Prevention, because we will not stand idle waiting boat 
after boat, criminal networks to exploit and often condemn to death innocent 
human beings…If we are to win the fight against the smugglers, Europe 
needs to be ready to take action in order to seize the boats, destroy them and 
arrest the smugglers and bring them to justice.”  
On 27 May 2015, the Commission announced its Action Plan against 
Migrant Smuggling 2015–2020, containing concrete actions to prevent and 
counter migrant smuggling. According to the press release, “actions include 
setting up a list of suspicious vessels; dedicated platforms to enhance 
cooperation and exchange of information with financial institutions; and 
cooperating with internet service providers and social media to ensure 
internet content used by smugglers to advertise their activities is swiftly 
detected and removed.”  
By a Council Decision of 18 May 20151 the Council authorised a 
military operation in the southern Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED, 
Operation SOPHIA)2 to counter smugglers of human beings. Its objective has 
been to mount a military crisis management operation contributing to the 
disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking 
networks in the south-central Mediterranean. It was allocated €11.82 million 
for the first 12 months. The mission has three phases: 
                                                     
1 CFSP 2015/778. 
2 OJ L 122, 19.5.2015, p. 31. 
O 
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1. In a first phase, support the detection and monitoring of migration 
networks through information gathering and patrolling on the high 
seas in accordance with international law; in a second phase,  conduct 
boarding, search, seizure and diversion on the high seas of vessels 
suspected of being used for human smuggling or trafficking, under the 
conditions provided for by applicable international law, including the 
United Nations Convention on the Laws of the See (UNCLOS) and the 
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants. 
2. In accordance with any applicable UN Security Council Resolution or 
consent by the coastal state concerned, conduct boarding, search, 
seizure and diversion, on the high seas or in the territorial and internal 
waters of that state, of vessels suspected of being used for human 
smuggling or trafficking, under the conditions set out in that 
Resolution or consent. 
3. In a third phase, in accordance with any applicable UN Security 
Council Resolution or consent by the coastal state concerned, take all 
necessary measures against a vessel and related assets, including 
through disposing of them or rendering them inoperable, which are 
suspected of being used for human smuggling or trafficking, in the 
territory of that state, under the conditions set out in that Resolution or 
consent. 
On 22 June the military operation was launched, in accordance with 
the first phase instructions. The second phase started on 7 October after the 
European External Action Service succeeded in obtaining a UN Security 
Council resolution on the subject.3  
All of these actions have sparked controversy. This chapter assesses 
the political statements and deployment of military operations and other EU 
security agencies on the ground ‘to counter smugglers of human beings’ 
against the results for the third quarter of 2015, as published by Frontex on 
20 January 2016.4 
In the language of Frontex, smugglers are included in a somewhat 
larger category which is entitled ‘facilitators’. This category is determined by 
EU law – the Facilitation Directive5 which is currently under examination for 
                                                     
3 UN Security Council Resolution 2240(2015). See also http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/ 
missions-and-operations/eunavfor-med/index_en.htm 
4 Frontex (2015).  
5 Council Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of 
unauthorised entry, transit and residence. 
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renewal by the Commission. According to Frontex, the vast majority of 
facilitators are detected ‘inland’, that is, inside the EU. This is of course a 
complicated category, as it includes all sorts of persons who may be assisting 
migrants so long as there is some element of profit. However, there is no 
clear differentiation between businesses carrying on their usual operations, 
such as shops and hotels, and facilitators who profit from assisting persons 
who are irregularly present. 
In any event, in Q3 2015, the first period for which we have statistics 
after the commencement of EUNAVFOR MED, it appears that a total of 3,166 
persons were detected as facilitators of irregularly arriving and present 
third-country nationals. The majority of persons so detected were found 
inland, that is, after arrival into the EU (1,595), while 956 were detected at 
land borders and 332 at sea borders. At intra EU member state borders a 
further 185 persons were detected. 
The top five nationalities of the persons detected were: Moroccan (323), 
Syrian (190), Hungarian (187), Spanish (168) and Albanian (145).  
Over the period 17 March through 2 December 2015, EUROPOL, 
which has been charged with coordinating EU police action against 
smugglers, issued seven press releases on the subject. Commencing with the 
17 March 2015 release, EUROPOL announced that it had launched a Joint 
Operation Team (JOT Mare) to tackle the organised criminal groups who are 
facilitating the journeys of migrants by ship across the Mediterranean to the 
EU.6 The need for the JOT according to EUROPOL was the recognition by 
the EU and member states of the need for a more ‘balanced strategy’ to 
combat irregular migration with the refocusing of law enforcement 
resources to disrupt the organised crime groups involved.  
The next press release, dated 25 March, announced that with the 
support of nearly 400 law enforcement officers, 77 individuals suspected of 
large-scale irregular migrant smuggling from Kosovo had been arrested. The 
arrests took place in Austria, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Slovakia 
and Kosovo.7 
On 8 October 2015, the next press release announced Operation 
Bouquet, led by France and Portugal, had resulted in the arrest of six 
smugglers and 30 migrants (mainly from Hindustan). The released added 
                                                     
6 Europol (2015a). 
7 A EUROJUST press release repeats its EUROPOL counterpart with no addition. 
See also Europol (2015b). 
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that EUROPOL had been supporting Operation Bouquet since 2013 and 
EUROJUST had been providing judicial support.8 There is no indication of 
how many officers were involved. The only press release on the EUROJUST 
website about Operation Bouquet relates to an action in December 2013.  
On 12 October, EUROPOL issued a press release on the arrest of 89 
persons, coordinated by the Spanish national police targeting a Chinese 
crime group specialising in smuggling people into Spain, onwards to the UK 
and further afield to Canada and the US.  
Next, on 3 November, EUROPOL announced the arrest of 39 suspected 
migrant smugglers thought to be part of an organised crime network for 
Pakistani migrants across the Mediterranean; 365 police officers from Spain 
and Poland were involved, carrying out 60 inspections of restaurants 
suspected of being run by the gang and 51 house searches. Issues regarding 
labour standards were raised. Three weeks later, on 24 November, a 
EUROJUST action with EUROPOL support took place involving Belgium, 
the Czech Republic, Germany and the UK, involving more than 200 police 
officers. Eight persons were arrested, 10 houses were searched, six European 
Arrest Warrants were issued and 24 witnesses or suspects were identified. 
This gang appears to have been engaged in moving Albanians around 
Europe.   
Finally,9 on 2 December, EUROPOL announced that it had supported 
a large-scale joint operation involving police in Austria, Greece, Sweden and 
the UK which resulted in the arrest of 23 persons. This group appears to have 
mainly engaged in smuggling Syrians from Turkey to the EU. According to 
the press release:  
The alleged members of the criminal network had set up a 
‘headquarters’ in Greece, where migrants – either located in Turkey 
or on their way to Greece – would contact them for further assistance 
with their journeys to Northern Europe. All forms of assistance could 
be provided ranging from transport and supplying forged travel 
documents, to housing. The migrants paid the facilitators via money-
transfer services or with cash. As well as communicating by mobile 
phone, the suspects attempted to keep a low profile and elude capture 
by making use of social media channels and online communication 
platforms. 
                                                     
8 Europol (2015c). 
9 For a full overview of Europol press releases, see www.europol.europa.eu/ 
category/press-release-category/facilitated-illegal-immigration 
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 No indication was given of how many police were involved in this 
action.  
Notwithstanding this activity, according to Frontex, as of 20 January 
2016, only 687 persons had been apprehended clandestinely entering the EU 
in third quarter of 2015. This is down substantially from the third quarter of 
2014, when 965 persons were apprehended. Further, according to Frontex, in 
third quarter of 2015, 283,353 persons were apprehended as irregularly 
staying in the EU – up substantially from 2014 when in the third quarter the 
figure was 146,288. In 2015 the top five nationalities of apprehended persons 
were: Syrian, Afghan, Iraqi, Eritrean and Pakistani. As previously mentioned 
in the introductory chapter of this book, from the asylum statistics it seems 
likely that all of the people of these nationalities were in need of international 
protection. Their apprehension as ‘irregularly staying in the EU’ may have 
been a short prelude to their application for refugee status. Over the same 
quarter, 405,131 persons applied for asylum in the EU and the top five 
nationalities were Syrian, Afghan, Iraqi, Albanian and Pakistani.  
What can one conclude from this information about smuggling of 
people into the EU? 
First, the EU is willing to spend very substantial amounts of money on 
trying to prevent people arriving irregularly in the EU; we have no figures 
for the EUROPOL and EUROJUST activities, but the EUNAVFOR MED 
operation will cost €11.82 million for the first 12 months and there is no 
publicly available information regarding its concrete activities. 
Secondly, tackling the smuggling of human beings demands 
significant police time – hundreds of police are often involved in operations 
where fairly few people are arrested. The issue of the disruption of criminal 
operations is always important, but the mechanisms for this kind of 
disruption need to be examined against the value achieved. The cost of these 
JOTs must be fairly high not least because police in numerous member states 
are involved, requiring extensive back-up resources, including assistance in 
interpretation.  
Thirdly, the nationalities of the smugglers is puzzling. According to 
Frontex they are a very disparate group – Moroccans, Syrians, Hungarians, 
Spanish and Albanians. There is no obvious language through which they 
would communicate with one another. It seems likely that they specialise in 
providing services to people who speak their own languages rather than 
reaching out to a wider clientele. The nationalities of the people smuggled is 
also puzzling; in so far as this information is available from the EUROPOL 
press releases, they are Kosovars, North Indians or Pakistanis (the 
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Hindustanis) Chinese, Albanians and Syrians. It is unclear what these 
groups have in common – certainly not a language. This all points to highly 
segregated and specialised smuggling services, each designed to reach only 
one specific national group at a time.  
Fourthly, the addition of military force to the activities of border 
guards and police has not resulted in improved knowledge about the issue. 
There is no transparency at all of the SOPHIA operation – no press releases 
except about the size and cost of the operation, nothing about its activities. 
Thus there is no way to assess what it is doing.  
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 CROSS-BORDER COTTAGE INDUSTRIES 
AND FRAGMENTED MIGRATION 
MICHAEL COLLYER 
ver the past few decades, border control in Europe has focused on 
the ‘external’ border. This involves attempts to respond to migration 
before individual migrants and refugees reach European territory, 
as is evident in ongoing responses to the ‘migration crisis’. It also reflects the 
contradictory efforts of individual states to export border controls to other 
member states, as the UK does at the cross channel ports, with related 
consequences for irregular migrants in Calais.  
In this contribution, I consider two significant interpretations of the 
limited empirical evidence on irregular migration. Both affect the possibility 
of controlling the external border: first, much facilitation of irregular 
migration is not conducted through transnational criminal networks but ad 
hoc ‘cross-border cottage industries’; second, a significant proportion of 
irregular migrants and refugees do not travel directly from their state of 
origin to some European destination but pass through a whole series of 
destinations in a ‘fragmented migration’ that may last many years before an 
assumed final destination is reached. 
The 2002 Facilitation Directive1 is the main piece of harmonised 
legislation stipulating measures criminalising the facilitation of irregular 
migration. Article 1 of the Facilitation Directive distinguishes between the 
facilitation of irregular entry (Article 1a) and assistance of irregular residence 
(Article 1b). The main difference between the two is that facilitation of 
residence specifically mentions ‘financial gain’ whereas facilitation of entry 
does not. This has led to widespread concern about the criminalisation of 
more humanitarian interventions to support migrants in distress, which 
results in their entering Europe but involves no financial gain, the so-called 
                                                     
1 European Council (2002a). 
O 
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‘délits de solidarité’.2 In practical terms this has affected the willingness of 
small professional shipmasters, particularly fishing trawlers in the 
Mediterranean, to come to the rescue of migrants in distress. Calls for the 
clear decriminalisation of their involvement in sea rescue, and even 
systematic compensation, are now widespread.3 
The fundamental problem is one of political geography. Beyond 
European territory, the authority of member states changes and it becomes 
much more difficult to investigate and prosecute the facilitation of irregular 
migration. International waters offer some possibility for the use of coercive 
force, such as the attempts by the Italian navy to push back migrant boats to 
Libya, which began in 2009. Nevertheless, this was soon abandoned in the 
face of widespread criticism,4 and pan-European organisations, such as 
Frontex, do not have a mandate for the use of force anyway. Frederica 
Mogherini has publicly committed the EU institutions to the principle of 
non-refoulement, stating to the UN Security Council, “Let me explicitly 
assure you that no refugees or migrants intercepted at sea will be sent back 
against their will. Their rights under Geneva conventions will be fully 
honoured.”5 
This is a highly significant commitment and abandons the possibility 
of turning back irregular migrants once they have put to sea, due to the 
substantial chance that they are refugees. This effectively pushes the EU’s 
external border into the non-EU states bordering the Mediterranean. Since 
facilitators of irregular migration do not get into the boats with the migrants 
who pay them, the EU must therefore rely on cooperation with non-EU states 
to assist in the identification and prosecution of facilitators. The usual 
difficulties in this process are further exacerbated by the current political 
vacuum in Libya, which provides a relatively uncontrolled space for 
facilitation of irregular migration. Initial plans for unilateral European 
military action against ‘traffickers’ are now on hold, given the objections of 
the internationally recognised government of Libya. These difficulties are 
now well known, although they are exacerbated by a significant detail that 
appears to be overlooked in initial discussions: although much of the policy 
focus concerns transnational criminal operations, many facilitators of 
irregular migration run very small-scale operations. 
                                                     
2 FRA (2014). 
3 Carrera & den Hertog (2015). 
4 Human Rights Watch (2009).  
5 Mogherini (2015). 
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Given the at least partially criminal nature of organisations facilitating 
irregular migration, any systematic information on the variety in size and 
scale of their operations is impossible to obtain. It is clear that some 
organisations are very large-scale and transnationally organised. A recent 
survey by the United States Institute of Peace highlighted the growing 
connection between arms and drugs trafficking and the facilitation of 
irregular migration.6 These operations are large, extremely well organised 
and often pose threats of a more traditional security-focused nature, in 
addition to their role in the movement of migrants and refugees. They are no 
doubt already the focus of considerable attention from the European military 
intelligence community.  
Yet these large-scale transnational networks are only one model of the 
facilitation of irregular migration. There is now very substantial research 
evidence that many migrants and refugees are assisted by what David 
Spender (2004) referred to more than a decade ago as “cross-border cottage 
industries”; individuals or small groups who see an opportunity to profit 
from the presence of irregular migrants by assisting them to cross an 
individual border or difficult stretch of terrain. These patterns have been 
identified much more recently in the Mediterranean.7 This organisational 
structure is facilitated by the structure of migration patterns into what I have 
called “fragmented migration” in the context of irregular migration to 
Morocco.8 Fragmented migration describes the structure of international 
migration into a number of stages which are organised and paid for 
separately and may occur months or even years apart. Such migration may 
be presented as having a linear logic, an intention to reach a particular end 
point, that was completely absent at its outset. Subsequent stages often 
develop out of disappointment or danger encountered at earlier stages.  
Fragmented migration has implications for the protection of irregular 
migrants, but also for policy approaches which set out to counter such 
migration. In protection terms, the destinations available to an individual 
migrant or refugee are frequently determined by the financial resources they 
can mobilise.9 They may therefore reach intermediary destinations with very 
limited resources and are much more vulnerable to exploitation in the labour 
market or in the organisation of onward migration. At each stage they must 
                                                     
6 See Shaw & Mangan (2014). 
7 See Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime (2014). 
8 See Collyer (2010).  
9 See Van Hear (2014). 
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negotiate separately for onward passage, sometimes spending many months 
in intermediary locations. It is during these periods that they come to know 
the border crossing operations better and are more likely to encounter the 
much smaller scale ‘cottage industry’ operations. 
In turn, this has implications for ongoing European Union efforts to 
counter these operations. In the case of transnational organisations or regular 
involvement in the facilitation of irregular migration, data can be (and no 
doubt is being) collected, but where an individual or small group provides 
occasional or ad hoc assistance at particular borders, systematic information 
is much harder to collect. Any kind of preventative action in Libya is very 
difficult to imagine without the re-establishment of centralised authority. 
Even outside Libya, isolated incidents are by definition extremely hard to 
predict and prevent without large-scale surveillance operations. And even if 
movement can be prevented, this does not reduce the vulnerability of 
migrants who have already reached countries neighbouring the EU.  
The assumption inherent in many of these policy initiatives at the 
external border is not that migrant facilitators can be easily identified and 
prosecuted, but that interrupting their operations will result in such pain and 
misery for irregular migrants that news will get back to potential migrants 
and they will stop coming. This is the logic behind the British government’s 
refusal to support large-scale rescue of irregular migrants in the 
Mediterranean. Yet it once again overlooks the structural reality of 
fragmented migration. If a significant proportion of those leaving countries 
of origin have little hope of making it to Europe but only wish to find security 
or livelihood across the nearest border, communicating the risks at a distant 
border point with Europe will have little impact on their decision to leave. 
If, through desperation and access to limited funds, they eventually reach 
the shores of the Mediterranean, being informed in advance will have little 
impact, as the risks of moving on may appear more attractive than the 
difficulties of returning home. Knowledge of difficulties is only an effective 
deterrent for those who try to come directly from their country of residence 
and this may only be a minority of irregular migrants and even refugees. 
There is no more effective rebuttal to the idea that making the lives of 
irregular migrants as miserable as possible acts as effective deterrence than 
the UK’s own borders. As a member of the EU, but not a member of the 
Schengen zone, the UK operates its own external border controls within the 
territory of other member states. According to an article in The Guardian 
(2013), the government’s declared intention is to create a “hostile 
environment” for irregular migrants once they have entered the country. But 
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for the last 15 years, the increasingly hostile environment of northern France 
has done nothing to deter a small but growing number of migrants from 
camping out in often appalling conditions for months at a time in the hope 
of getting an opportunity to reach the UK. It is not known how many of the 
currently 3,000 or so migrants waiting in Calais will make it to the UK and 
how many will give up and go elsewhere, though it is clear that 15 years of 
developing ever more sophisticated security technology to stop them has 
had little effect on the numbers of those who try.  
My main argument here is in two parts. First, restricting the facilitation 
of migration is unlikely to succeed, partly due to the small-scale ‘cottage 
industry’ organisation of many facilitators of irregular migration. Second, 
the structural organisation of long overland journeys into multiple 
fragmented sections means that policies of ‘hostile environment’-style 
deterrence near the intended destination will have few knock-on effects on 
departures. Together these suggest that criminalisation and securitisation 
may have some effects, but they will certainly not eliminate irregular 
migration. If these more repressive responses will not work, indeed have 
long been shown not to work, it follows that a more liberal approach may be 
worth investigating.  
More pro-migrant policies may be justified on humanitarian grounds, 
but they are also likely to have significant impacts on the numbers of 
migrants attempting hazardous maritime or overland journeys. They may 
take two approaches: either offering a clear alternative to irregular migration 
or improving the conditions along the route of these fragmented migrations. 
Clear examples of the provision of alternatives are refugee resettlement, and 
the greater flexibility of other visa categories (such as family reunification) 
for migrants with broader humanitarian reasons for leaving. Resettlement 
already forms part of the policy response of the EU and even if this has found 
disappointing support from member states so far, it is a necessary element 
of any response. It could be usefully supplemented by greater visa 
liberalisation for nationalities (such as Syrian or Eritrean) that are 
significantly represented in cross-Mediterranean migrations. Those with 
family in Europe are likely to be the most determined and the best resourced 
to come anyway, so family reunification will offer a shortcut and take 
significant business away from migrant facilitators.  
The second more liberal approach is to improve conditions in countries 
where migrants and refugees spend significant periods of time so that the 
need to move on will not seem so urgent. The clearest recent example of this 
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trend is the regularisation in Morocco in 2014.10 This was small-scale and is 
still criticised by some migrants’ rights groups, but it offers a bold alternative 
to the ‘hostile environment’ rhetoric. A second example is the positive 
impact of regional free movement agreements, such as that of the Economic 
Organisation of West African States (ECOWAS). This system allows 
international migrants some security in crossing the nearest border without 
continual fear of arrest and contrasts markedly to the difficulties migrants 
face in East Africa. Given the limited success of more securitised approaches 
to eliminating the facilitation of migration, these examples offer more 
humanitarian alternatives for cutting the market for migrant facilitators and 
so improving the human rights of regular and irregular migrants and 
refugees.  
  
                                                     
10 See Cherti & Collyer (2015). 
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 MANAGING MIGRATION THROUGH 
LEGITIMACY? ALTERNATIVES TO THE 
CRIMINALISATION OF UNAUTHORISED 
MIGRATION 
ARJEN LEERKES 
Introduction 
It is common practice in the sociology of law to make a distinction between 
instrumental and normative models of compliance.1 Whereas the former 
models explain compliance from self-interested calculation on the part of 
those who are targeted by a law, the latter models maintain that the law is 
followed to the extent that relevant actors believe that doing so is right. The 
lion’s share of the policies that governments have developed to limit 
‘unwanted’ migration follows an instrumental logic – either explicitly or 
implicitly – and focuses on negative sanctions: a central policy assumption 
is that illegal residence can be reduced by using force and by influencing 
unauthorised migrants’ calculus through increasing the costs of illegal 
residence, and decreasing its benefits.  
While the degree of de jure criminalisation is limited – in most Western 
countries illegal residence as such is not a crime – the de facto criminalisation 
is increasingly widespread: using administrative law, governments on both 
sides of the Atlantic inflict a considerable measure of pain on those violating 
migration laws, be it by holding unauthorised migrants in immigration 
detention centres for considerable periods of time, or by denying those 
without the right papers access to labour and housing markets, and (most) 
                                                     
1 See Tyler (1990). 
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health care. Hereafter, all policies that contribute to a de jure or de facto 
criminalisation of unauthorised migrants will be called ‘deterrence policies’. 
There are at least three reasons to consider alternative policy strategies 
that rely less on deterrence. Firstly, regardless of their practical effects, 
deterrence policies tend to frame unauthorised residence as something 
criminal or criminal-like. Various scholars have argued that such framings 
are inappropriate given the – in their view – fundamental non-criminal 
nature of migration.2 Secondly, there is no evidence that deterrence policies 
have been highly effective in reducing unauthorised migration.3 Thirdly, 
deterrence policies are known to produce various negative side-effects: 
while the increased closing off of physical borders in an effort to deter 
unwanted migration has contributed to a rise in human smuggling and 
migrant deaths,4 the closing off of labour and housing markets has 
exacerbated the marginalisation of unauthorised immigrants who remain in 
the state’s territory, thereby increasing their risk of falling victim to 
homelessness, health issues and petty crime.5  
The predominance of instrumental models of compliance through 
negative sanctions is probably, at least in part, due to migration rules being 
highly contested: admission criteria tend to be protectionist, benefiting 
citizens of prosperous, safe and free countries much more than they do 
citizens of poor, unsafe and relatively unfree countries – who also did not 
get the chance to vote on these rules. One could ask: How is compliance on 
normative grounds even possible in the context of such a fundamental 
conflict of interests?  
In this chapter, I make two points. Firstly, using examples from my 
research on deportation and Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR), I illustrate 
that normative models of compliance deserve more policy attention than 
they are currently being given. Secondly, I show that there tends to be a 
tension between such models and deterrence, suggesting that the former 
cannot simply be used as an additive to the latter. While instrumental and 
                                                     
2 See for example, Zedner (2013). 
3 Espenshade (1994); Massey, Durand & Malone (2002); Cornelius & Salehyan (2007); 
Leerkes et al. (2012); Leerkes et al. (2013). Some measures, such as the increased 
militarisation of the US-Mexican border in the context of a persistent demand for 
cheap labour, may even have increased unauthorised stay by turning temporary 
migration into permanent settlement (Massey et al., 2002). 
4 Cornelius (2001). 
5 Leerkes et al. (2012). 
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normative models do not rule each other out, pushing deterrence policies too 
far tends to undermine compliance on normative grounds.     
In normative models of compliance, a distinction is usually made 
between the normative evaluation of outcomes ('distributive justice') and the 
evaluation of procedures ('procedural justice'). Distributive justice means that 
the content of a rule is considered fair. Procedural justice means that a rule 
is enforced in ways that are perceived as just. In what follows, I discuss 
results from Dutch studies on forced return and Assisted Voluntary Return 
(AVR). I first illustrate how an increase in the perceived distributive justice 
of migration rules seems to have increased the willingness among receiving 
states to comply with forced return (‘states’). I then discuss results from two 
projects that indicate that various aspects of distributive and procedural 
justice are also capable of obtaining compliance at the individual level 
(‘migrants’).  
States 
The chances of deportation procedures resulting in deportation depend, at 
least partly, on the extent to which source countries are willing to take their 
nationals back. Their role is particularly decisive in cases where a laissez 
passer needs to be applied for because migrants are unable or unwilling to 
show a valid ID. Van Kalmthout et al. (2004) conducted a large number of 
in-depth interviews with immigration detainees, documenting their 
personal situation in the country of origin and the Netherlands, their stay in 
immigration detention, and their attitude with regards to staying in, or 
departing from, the Netherlands. The Dutch government provided the 
researchers with information on whether the respondents were eventually 
deported or released because of failed deportation procedure. The dataset 
was given to me for secondary analysis.   
I became interested in the relationship between legitimacy and border 
control when I learned that deportation procedures involving EU candidate 
countries were considerably more likely to result in deportation than those 
involving other countries, especially among detainees who – according to 
Van Kalmthout’s measurements – did not want to go to their country of 
citizenship, and may have tried to resist deportation. Detainees who 
originated from (potential) candidate countries of the EU and who did not 
want to go to their country of citizenship had a 72% chance of being 
deported, against only 50% of those with similar migration preferences who 
originated from other countries (see Table 1). Among respondents who were 
prepared to go to their country of citizenship, these figures were 79% and 
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73% respectively, indicating that detainees’ personal migration preferences 
hardly mattered among citizens of countries that were (potential) candidate 
EU members at the time. These results confirm the case study by Ellermann 
(2005), who has documented the experiences of the German authorities in 
negotiating and implementing readmission agreements with Romania and 
Vietnam. In the case of Romania – an EU candidate country at the time – the 
German authorities were quite effective in implementing the agreement. In 
the case of Vietnam, both negotiation and implementation of the readmission 
agreement turned out to be difficult, in spite of significant payments by the 
German state to Vietnam of about €100 million.  
It may be argued that EU member states simply gave (potential) 
candidate countries a stronger incentive to comply with forced return than 
they gave to countries like Vietnam. In my view, however, such an 
economistic, ‘instrumental’ account misses something essential. What the 
prospect of EU membership will also have achieved is a greater perceived 
fairness of deportation as a result of the increased openings for legal 
migration and, more generally, because of a sense of partnership. (Romania 
and several other candidate member states were exempted from Schengen 
visa requirements in 2001.) Compensatory payments, by contrast, will 
certainly affect countries’ cost-benefit ratios, but they may also symbolically 
reinforce international inequality, thereby contributing to a greater 
perceived distributive unfairness of migration rules. 
Table 1. Probability of immigration detention resulting in deportation by country 
of origin and detainees’ willingness to return  
 Released Deported Total 
Wanted to return    
(Potential) candidate member statesa 3 (21%) 11 (79%) 5 (100%) 
Other countries  14 (27%) 37 (73%) 51 (100%) 
Did not want to return    
(Potential) candidate member statesa 7 (28%) 18 (72%) 25 (100%) 
Other countries 94 (50%) 94 (50%) 188 (100%) 
a Includes all countries that became EU member states in 2004 or 2007, and Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey. 
Migrants  
Two studies that I recently directed found suggestive evidence that aspects 
of (il)legitimacy are similarly important for understanding ‘return’ attitudes 
and behaviour among migrants. In the first study, we used a survey 
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conducted among 461 immigration detainees in the Netherlands, and 
conducted interviews with detainees as well as detention supervisors.6 It was 
investigated whether and, if so, via what mechanisms, immigration 
detainees’ migration preferences changed during their detention.  
The survey was part of a monitoring programme by the Custodial 
Institutions Agency (DJI) on the quality of life in detention centres and 
prisons, and we had limited influence on the precise wording and number 
of the items that DJI agreed to include for the study. Eventual changes in 
migration preferences were measured with the item: “Since I am detained, 
my willingness to leave the Netherlands has increased” (answer categories 
were “disagree strongly”, “disagree”, “do not agree / do not disagree”, 
“agree”, “agree strongly”). DJI chose to measure the perceived distributive 
justice of immigration detention and deportation with the item: “I 
understand that I am being detained with a view to deportation.” Procedural 
justice was measured using various items on detainees’ satisfaction 
regarding the rules and rights in the detention centre, and their satisfaction 
regarding the detention supervisors. Detainees’ knowledge and satisfaction 
regarding the availability of return and reintegration support, such as 
provided by IOM through Assisted Voluntary Return from Detention 
(AVRD), was measured as well, as were various aspects of the detention 
experience that may have had a deterrent effect (detention duration, number 
of detention periods, perceived material and other deprivations during the 
detention).  
It turned out that a minority of 23.6% of the respondents agreed or 
agreed strongly that the willingness to leave the Netherlands had increased 
during the detention (56.4% disagreed or disagreed strongly, and 20% were 
neutral). The two most important predictors of an increased willingness to 
leave were (1) perceived distributive justice and (2) satisfaction regarding the 
availability of return and reintegration support. While perceived procedural 
justice did not have a direct effect on changes in migration preferences, we 
did find that respondents who were relatively positive about rights and rules 
were also relatively positive and better informed about return and 
reintegration support in the detention centre. This suggests that procedural 
justice had an indirect effect on return preferences by increasing detainees’ 
satisfaction regarding return and reintegration support.  
We found limited evidence that respondents’ willingness to leave the 
country of the detaining state increased as a result of deterrence. 
                                                     
6 See Van Alphen et al. (2013). 
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Respondents who had been detained repeatedly were indeed more likely to 
report an increased willingness to leave the Netherlands than those who 
were being detained for the first time, but respondents who were highly 
unsatisfied with the detention conditions, or who had been detained for a 
long period, were not more likely to report an increased willingness to leave 
the country. 
A tension between instrumental models (in the form of deterrence) and 
normative models of compliance could also be observed. Detainees who had 
been detained for a relatively long duration, or who had been detained 
repeatedly, scored lower on distributive and procedural justice, suggesting 
that potential deterrent effects of ‘tough’ detention practices were partially, 
or even totally, annulled by a related decrease in the perceived legitimacy of 
forced return.  
The second study (Leerkes et al., 2014) looked at the factors 
determining the degree to which rejected asylum seekers make use of AVR. 
Two findings in particular suggested that aspects of perceived procedural 
justice co-determine AVR participation. Firstly, a curvilinear relationship was 
found between the duration of the asylum procedure in the first instance and 
the chances of AVR participation: with other factors held constant, including 
political and economic conditions in countries of origin and migrants’ family 
composition in the Netherlands, AVR rates were relatively low among those 
who had been rejected after quite some time (more than nine months) and 
who had been rejected quickly (after a few days or weeks). Asylum seekers 
in both categories were also relatively likely to appeal the rejection in the first 
instance, suggesting that rejections after very short or very long admission 
procedures have less legitimacy in the eyes of asylum seekers and their 
lawyers. While a logic of discouragement and coercion would have it that 
‘undeserving’ asylum seekers should be rejected as soon as possible so as to 
prevent them from developing ties to the country of asylum, it overlooks that 
potential deterrent effects (here: of quick admission decisions) may well be 
offset by a related decrease in the perceived legitimacy of migration rules 
(here: of status determination procedures).  
Secondly, it was found that rejected asylum seekers who had access to 
what are called native counsellors – IOM employees who originate from 
relevant migrant groups and speak their language – were relatively likely to 
make use of AVR. Native counsellors were introduced because IOM felt that 
potential returnees are more likely to trust persons who are from their own 
country of origin and whom they can meet with repeatedly in an informal 
setting. The native counsellors will have increased the legitimacy of IOM and 
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the perceived procedural justice of migration rules. Legitimacy, especially 
procedural justice, is known to be closely related to trust.7 
While a certain degree of deterrence may create an interest on the part 
of rejected asylum seekers to inquire about AVR possibilities – indeed, the 
‘voluntariness’ of AVR can often be questioned on this ground – deterrence 
creates fear, not trust, thereby potentially undercutting the efficacy of 
functionaries like the native counsellors. Again, there is a tension between 
the – de jure or de facto – criminalisation of illegal residence and normative 
models of compliance. 
Conclusions  
In order to be effective, laws are in need of legitimation, and this also goes 
for migration rules. While philosophers have argued about what richer 
countries owe inhabitants of poorer countries,8 I take a more sociological, 
empirical stance on these matters and try to ask whether and why relevant 
actors – states, migrants, potential migrants, relevant professionals such as 
migration lawyers, NGOs, employers – perceive migration rules and 
procedures as just or unjust. Although international migration is 
increasingly being regulated, there still is surprisingly limited research on 
the influence of legitimacy in shaping migration patterns. It is clear, 
however, that migration rules, and the mechanisms to enforce them, do not 
have full legitimacy in the eyes of actors that co-determine migration 
patterns, and that this explains a significant part of the difficulties that 
governments in receiving countries experience in enforcing migration rules. 
The purpose of this chapter is to show that this does not imply that 
governments could not rely more on normative models of compliance than 
they do at present: increased opportunities for legal migration seem to 
increase the willingness by states to cooperate with return procedures, and 
individuals who understand and accept the outcomes of admission or return 
procedures, and/or who feel they are being treated fairly by trustworthy 
functionaries, are more likely to comply with migration rules. Of course, it 
would be wrong to say that no attention is being given to aspects of justice, 
especially in the European context – immigrants are usually given access to 
judges and legal representation, the Return Directive stipulates that migrants 
should first get a chance to return ‘voluntarily’ before they are being 
                                                     
7 See, for example, Hough et al. (2010). 
8 See, for example, Blake (2001). 
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detained with a view to deportation, et cetera. However, no systematic 
attention is being paid to these issues from the perspective of migration 
management. There is a tendency among policy-makers and voters to see 
immigrant rights as civilised, perhaps, but also as detrimental to effective 
migration control (‘Why don’t you just kick them out?’).  
Although it may be impossible and undesirable to offer all source 
countries of unauthorised migration a perspective on EU membership, the 
perceived distributive justice of migration rules could probably be increased 
in other ways, for example by enhancing the opportunities for temporary 
labour or study migration programmes that are designed to benefit sending 
countries, receiving countries and immigrants alike. Managing migration 
through legitimacy also requires the willingness of rich countries to 
systematically monitor admission and return procedures on perceived 
procedural justice, and to take the perspectives of non-citizens on these 
issues seriously.  
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 HUMAN SMUGGLING AND IRREGULAR 
IMMIGRATION IN THE EU: FROM 
COMPLICITY TO EXPLOITATION? 
ALESSANDRO SPENA 
Introduction 
In the recently launched EU Action Plan against Migrant Smuggling (2015 – 
2020),1 the European Commission announces, among other things, that it 
“will make, in 2016, proposals to improve the existing EU legal framework 
to tackle migrant smuggling which defines the offence of facilitation of 
unauthorized entry and residence, and strengthen the penal framework.” 
But how should these proposals be shaped? How, in particular, should 
the existing penal framework be changed? This depends, to a large extent, 
on the aims that are deemed to be worth pursuing by addressing human 
smuggling as a problem. 
Two possible approaches to human smuggling 
In principle, there are two main reasons why states may be willing to counter 
human smuggling. The first has to do with its being linked to irregular 
immigration: although it should be clear that not all smuggled migrants are 
irregular in the proper sense (many of them being refugees and asylum 
seekers), smuggling is nonetheless one of the most eye-catching ways (at 
least for the mass media) by which irregular immigration takes place; 
fighting it can thus be a way of fighting irregular immigration itself. 
Smuggled migrants are given an unclear role under this approach: while, on 
the one hand, they are not necessarily to be criminalised for the mere fact of 
having been smuggled, on the other hand, it is clear that their rights and 
                                                     
1 European Commission (2015). 
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needs are not what states are fighting for when they adopt this perspective. 
In a sense, migrants are rather part of the problem that is ultimately addressed 
by fighting smuggling. 
The second reason why states may be particularly concerned with 
human smuggling stems, instead, from the need to protect the migrants 
themselves from the many risks they may face if smuggled: economic 
exploitation, deception, degrading treatment along the way, death, and so 
on.2 Under this approach,3 smuggled migrants will probably be perceived, 
to a certain extent, as victims – either of the smugglers who thrive on their 
aspiration to go abroad or of the (political, economic, climatic) situations due 
to which they decide to migrate by entrusting themselves to smugglers. 
The EU Approach: Smuggling as complicity in irregular 
migration 
The EU law against human smuggling so far has been strongly dominated 
by the aim to fight irregular migration. 
The key legislative pieces in this field, the Facilitation Framework 
Decision4 and the Facilitation Directive,5 do not even speak of “human 
smuggling”, but of “facilitation of irregular migration”, which displays from 
the very beginning the fact that the focus here is not so much on smuggled 
migrants as objects or victims of a crime as on them as authors of the conduct 
that is ultimately sought to be prevented, i.e. irregular migration. 
Accordingly, Art. 1, Facilitation Directive makes the definition of the 
“general infringement” of facilitation revolve around the conduct of 
“assisting” irregular immigrants either to enter (Art. 1(1)(a)) or to stay in 
(Art. 1(1)(b)) the territory of a member state,6 which clearly shows that, in the 
Facilitation Directive’s perspective, human smuggling’s wrongness is seen 
                                                     
2 On these risks, see, e.g. UNODC (2010), Ch. IX; De Bruycker, Di Bartolomeo & 
Fargues (2013), p. 4ff; Global Initiative (2014), p. 7ff. 
3 See e.g. Obokata (2005); Ventrella (2015).  
4 European Council (2002a). 
5 European Council (2002b). 
6 Art. 1(1)(a) also mentions the conduct of transiting across the territory of a member 
state; but this is clearly a redundant addition, since the fact of “irregularly transiting” 
is already absorbed either in that of “irregularly entering” or in that of “irregularly 
staying”: I can’t see how one could irregularly transit across the territory of a 
member state without irregularly entering or staying therein. 
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as residing in its being a help to migrants who aspire to irregularly migrate 
to the EU. This becomes even more clear if we consider that as regards the 
conduct of facilitation of entrance, the definition of the offence does not even 
require the facilitator to act “for financial gain” (as is required in the case of 
facilitation of stay), which apparently entails that the independent moral 
content of the facilitator’s conduct is of secondary importance to the 
definition of what’s wrong with smuggling from the EU’s point of view. 
In other words, although irregular migration is not directly 
criminalised either in the Facilitation Directive or in the Facilitation 
Framework Decision, it is nonetheless this conduct that is seen as bearing the 
core wrongness at stake here. Paradoxical as it may seem, in the Facilitation 
Directive’s approach, smuggling, as a form of facilitation, is only wrongful 
in an ancillary way, as if it was only a form of complicity in the real wrong, 
which is the wrong of irregular migration. 
A “complicity approach” to smuggling is the logical consequence of 
the EU’s general approach to migration during the last few years, which has 
been basically driven by the need to secure the EU’s external borders as a 
countermeasure for having opened the internal borders between member 
states (so-called ‘Fortress Europe’).7 This has brought it a veritable obsession 
with the fight against irregular migration: an obsession of which the EU’s 
way of fighting smuggling is a corollary. 
The rights of the smuggled persons in EU law 
EU law, of course, does not completely disregard the rights of smuggled 
migrants; it could not do so, since many of these rights are either expressly 
recognised in the EU Charter of the Fundamental Rights or are the object of 
international obligations for the member states.8 My point is, however, that 
EU law does not pay these rights the attention they deserve. 
Two examples. According to Art. 1(2), “Any member state may decide 
not to impose sanctions with regard to the behaviour defined in paragraph 
1(a) by applying its national law and practice for cases where the aim of the 
behaviour is to provide humanitarian assistance to the person concerned.” 
Behind this apparently in bonam partem provision, there lies a clue to the fact 
that humanitarian concerns are not a key worry for EU law against 
smuggling. The meaning of Art. 1(2) is, indeed, that member states are not 
                                                     
7 European Parliament & Council (2006) (“Schengen Borders Code”). 
8 See e.g. Obokata (2005), p. 400ff. 
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obliged, but merely permitted to grant “facilitators” a humanitarian defence 
for their conduct, which unavoidably makes helping immigrants more risky 
for potential helpers, thereby indirectly impinging upon the chances 
migrants have to be helped when they find themselves in need of 
humanitarian assistance.9 
Another telling example is Art. 1(3), second indent, of the Facilitation 
Framework Decision, which requires member states to punish facilitation of 
entry (as well as, “to the extent relevant”, the conduct defined in Art. 2(a) 
Facilitation Directive) more severely if committed “while endangering the 
lives of the persons who are the subject of the offence.” This shows, again, 
that insufficient attention is paid to immigrants’ rights: why indeed limit the 
scope of this aggravated responsibility to the fact that the migrants’ lives are 
put at risk, hence overlooking the relevance of many other ways in which 
migrants can be victimised during the smuggling process (exploitation, 
deception, extortion, maltreatment)?10 
The UN approach to migrant smuggling 
The UN approach to human smuggling, as it emerges from the UN Protocol 
against Smuggling (UNPS),11 is considerably different from that of the EU. 
Even though it does not formally qualify smuggled migrants as victims,12 the 
protection of their rights is among the Protocol’s main concerns, as is 
explicitly stated, for example, in Art. 2: “The purpose of this Protocol is to 
prevent and combat the smuggling of migrants, as well as to promote 
cooperation among states Parties to that end, while protecting the rights of 
smuggled migrants.”13 
                                                     
9 See, e.g. Guild & Carrera (2013), p. 2, where the authors note that underscoring “the 
role of current EU anti-smuggling and trafficking legislation and the way it has been 
transposed into national law by EU member states, which often creates a 
presumption that a captain is committing the offence of smuggling or trafficking if 
he or she brings unauthorized people into harbours. The consequence is criminal 
prosecution and confiscation of the individual’s boat.” 
10 See, e.g. Obokata (2005), pp. 400ff. 
11 United Nations (2000a).  
12 But see Rodríguez Ocotrinillo (2014), p. 2.  
13 This does not mean that the Protocol is not itself open to criticism (see, e.g. 
Gallagher (2001) pp. 996ff). However, there is little doubt that its approach is far 
more attentive to smuggled migrants’ rights than is the EU legislation. 
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Accordingly, the general definition of the offence in the UNPS is not 
framed in terms of “complicity” (“help”, “assistance”) in the immigrants’ 
conduct (as it is in the Facilitation Directive), but as “the procurement…of 
the illegal entry of a person into a state Party of which the person is not a 
national or a permanent resident” (Art. 3(a)). This terminological shift has 
important conceptual implications: while “assisting” denotes an ancillary 
action, which entails that the principal action is performed by the person 
who is assisted (in this case, the irregular immigrant), “procuring” denotes 
instead a stand-alone action, with a meaning of its own; this difference is 
confirmed by the fact that while the Facilitation Directive describes the role 
of the smuggled migrant by using verbs (“assisting someone to enter”, “to 
transit”, “to stay”), thus revealing that the person is seen as someone actively 
contributing to the whole deed, the UNPS, on the contrary, uses – at least in 
Art. 3(a) – a noun (“procuring the entry of someone”), thus describing the 
migrant’s position more as the result of another person’s action than as an 
action itself. 
We can thus say that in the UNPS the smuggler’s conduct is recognised 
to have a wrongness of its own: a wrongness that is not a mere reflection of 
irregular migration, but derives directly from its being a commodification of 
human beings,14 an exploitation of the migrant’s vulnerability as a source of 
enrichment, of money-making. And indeed, according to the definition in 
Art. 3(a), the “procurement of the illegal entry of a person” does not amount 
to smuggling unless it is committed “in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, 
a financial or other material benefit”:15 the smuggler’s aim of getting some 
material benefit from his conduct is a definitional element of the crime, 
which heavily contributes to shaping its wrongness in terms of exploitation, 
while, on the other hand, excludes from the scope of the criminalisation “the 
activities of those who provided support to migrants for humanitarian 
reasons or on the basis of close family ties.”16 
Particularly telling, moreover, is Art. 5 UNPS, according to which 
“Migrants shall not become liable to criminal prosecution under this Protocol 
for the fact of having been the object of” smuggling. This reinforces the idea 
                                                     
14 UNODC (2004), § 55. 
15 But see also Art. 6(1). 
16 United Nations (2000b) § 88 (but see also § 92: “It was not the intention of the 
Protocol to criminalize the activities of family members or support groups such as 
religious or non-governmental organizations”). 
38  ALESSANDRO SPENA 
 
that, in the UNPS’s approach, the smuggled migrant is seen as the “object” 
of the smuggler’s conduct, and not as an agent of the smuggling process. 
This is why the fact of being smuggled should never be blamed on him.17 
Also interesting is the fact that, according to Art. 6(3), each state party 
should consider “as aggravating circumstances” the fact that the smuggling 
is performed in ways “(a) [t]hat endanger, or are likely to endanger, the lives 
or safety of the migrants concerned; or (b) [t]hat entail inhuman or degrading 
treatment, including for exploitation, of such migrants.” The scope of this 
provision is far wider than that of the similar provision in Art. 1(3) of the 
Facilitation Framework Decision: while, as we have seen, the latter only 
gives relevance to the migrants’ lives being put at risk, the other goes as far 
as to give relevance to other aspects of the smuggled migrants’ dignity and 
well-being. 
The way forward 
The Action Plan presented by the European Commission seems ready to 
abandon the “complicity approach” to human smuggling. I have no space 
here to go deeply into this document, but I want to mention a revealing 
aspect of how significantly different its general philosophy seems to be from 
that of the Facilitation Directive and the Facilitation Framework Decision. 
Smugglers, indeed, are not depicted as mere migrants’ facilitators anymore; 
on the contrary, their relationship with those smuggled begins to be 
interpreted more properly as one of exploitation (“Smugglers treat migrants 
as goods, similar to the drugs and firearms that they traffic along the same 
routes”), in which the migrants’ lives and human rights are jeopardised in 
order to obtain material gains (smugglers “make substantial gains while 
putting the migrants lives at risk. To maximize their profits, smugglers often 
squeeze hundreds of migrants onto unseaworthy boats – including small 
inflatable boats or end-of-life cargo ships – or into trucks. Scores of migrants 
drown at sea, suffocate in containers or perish in deserts. […] The human 
rights of migrants are often gravely violated through abuse and 
exploitation”). 
Since the “complicity approach” does not pay sufficient attention to 
migrants’ rights, this change is surely to be welcomed. The question, 
however, is how should this framework be reconfigured in order to make 
this change effective, and not merely proclaimed. 
                                                     
17 See Rodríguez Ocotrinillo (2014), p. 2. 
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A good and readily feasible way to start would be to transpose the 
most significant aspects of the UNPS into the EU legislation. As a 
consequence: 
a) The “complicity” language should be replaced by a more apt use of the 
concept of “human smuggling”. 
b) The definition of the crime should thus revolve around the smuggler’s 
conduct of procuring a foreigner’s irregular entrance into or stay in the 
EU. 
c) It should also require that the smuggler’s conduct be performed “in 
order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material 
benefit.” (By the way, this would render it unnecessary to amend Art. 
1(2) Facilitation Directive, since humanitarian assistance, as well as 
familial assistance, would automatically fall outside the scope of a 
definition thus reframed.) 
d) An aggravated responsibility should be established not only in those 
cases in which migrants’ lives are put at risk but also when their safety, 
i.e. physical or mental health, is endangered, as well as in cases in 
which the smuggler’s conduct is performed in such ways as to “entail 
inhuman or degrading treatment, including for exploitation, of such 
migrants.” 
e) Lastly, it should be expressly stated that “migrants shall not become 
liable to criminal prosecution for the mere fact of having been 
smuggled.” 
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 MANAGING IRREGULAR MIGRANTS 
WITHIN THE EU 
SARAH SPENCER 
mong the residents of the European Union we know that there will 
always be some who have an irregular immigration status, 
notwithstanding prevention measures and those to enforce returns.  
In 2010 the European Commission accepted an estimate of this population 
as between 1.9 and 3.8 million,1 just 0.4-0.8% of the population of the then 
EU-27 (in 2008) but concentrated in some of our larger urban areas.  
Many irregular migrants thrive without coming to the attention of the 
authorities; others can find themselves in need of a public service for 
themselves or their children. In practice, member states, at national, regional 
and municipal level, find those needs cannot always be ignored because the 
cost of exclusion – for the public as well as for the individuals concerned – is 
too high. As a result, across the EU, member states grant some legal 
entitlements to irregular migrants to access public services, not least to health 
care and, for children, to education. They have done so, we found in a recent 
study,2 in part for humanitarian reasons – but also, significantly, because the 
social and economic cost of not doing so threatens states’ ability to deliver 
on other policy priorities. 
Levels of entitlement are not high – there remains a significant degree 
of exclusion. The geography of entitlements, as we showed in a report 
                                                     
1 European Commission (2010). 
2 A two-year study carried out under the auspices of an Open Society Fellowship 
mapping entitlements to health care and education across the EU-28, and conducting 
interviews across 14 member states with officials and politicians responsible for 
those decisions. See: www.compas.ox.ac.uk/research/welfare/service-provision-
to-irregular-migrants-in-europe/. 
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published in July 2015,3 is also highly uneven. Nevertheless, there is a 
normality of a level of inclusion in national laws – and, counter-intuitively 
perhaps, some notable extensions in entitlements in recent years:  legislation 
to extend access to health care and education in Sweden in 2013; access to 
HIV treatment granted in the UK in 2012; and protection for the victims of 
domestic violence in Spain the previous year, are just three examples. 
Significantly, there is a level of entitlement to services in countries where 
irregular entry and/or stay is a criminal offence, like Belgium, France, 
Germany, Sweden and the UK, and in those where it is not. 
The trend towards inclusion is particularly evident in relation to 
children. The personal and social consequences of exclusion are particularly 
high, and children are not felt to be responsible for the immigration decisions 
of their parents. In the vast majority of member states (23) these children 
have a legal entitlement to attend school, in 10 cases through an inclusive 
measure referring to them explicitly,4 and thus not merely a general 
provision from which they are not excluded. In eight member states5 they 
have the same entitlement to healthcare as children who are nationals 
(although, as in other cases, having an entitlement may not always translate 
into access in practice).  
This is not to paint a rosy picture. The other side of the coin is that there 
are five member states where there is no right to attend school and five where 
children, like adults, only have access to emergency care (and that is not 
necessarily free). Exclusion from shelter is a major concern, as is access to 
food and other essentials for those who are destitute. Yet the level of 
entitlements granted does mean we need to recognise that, even for national 
governments, there are competing priorities at play which mean 
enforcement action against irregular migrants is not the only issue at stake.  
Inclusion at the local level 
Competing priorities are even more evident at regional and municipal level. 
While there are local authorities that prioritise exclusion (parts of northern 
Italy come to mind),6 it is at the local level that the consequences of exclusion 
                                                     
3 Spencer & Hughes (2015).  
4 Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Romania, 
Spain and Sweden. 
5 Estonia, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Spain and Sweden. 
6 See for instance Ambrosini (2013). 
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are most keenly felt. As a result, there are regional and local authorities 
across Europe that stretch to the limits what national laws permit: variously 
providing access to not only healthcare and education but shelter, welfare 
payments, food banks, language tuition, advice services, official 
documentation such as birth certificates, and more. 
Why do they do so? Officials and politicians cite human rights, 
humanitarian and ethical reasons, particularly where children are 
concerned; but they also cite public health, tackling street sleeping, 
community cohesion, street prostitution and child protection as among the 
goals that cannot be met if this group of people is excluded.  
The efficient management of public services provides further grounds 
for inclusion – the need for reliable statistics on who is present in the area, 
for instance, explaining the requirement in Spain that irregular migrants be 
included in the municipal register. It can also be cheaper to provide a service 
than to administer exclusions, or to overburden accident and emergency 
departments with ailments which could more efficiently have been dealt 
with elsewhere.   
Finally, the authorities tell us that the provision of services and the 
opportunity it provides to build trust with irregular migrants can enable 
them to address the underlying problem – to help individuals resolve their 
immigration status or, if appropriate, assist them to return home. If 
individuals are excluded from services or in fear of detection should they 
come forward, that opportunity is lost. 
City and regional authorities are increasingly frustrated that the 
minimal level of entitlements that national governments do permit limit their 
capacity to engage in this way. They feel, as expressed by a Dutch city 
healthcare worker interviewed for our study, that national governments do 
not understand the reality of the challenges they face: “These people are 
here, some in desperate need, dying on the streets or involved in crime. The 
national government does not have to bother with the problems we have 
every day”.7 
There are many challenges to restrictions in national laws that have 
been taken through the courts, as in Italy8 and the UK9; as well as of 
                                                     
7 Interviewed by the author, March 2013. 
8 Documented in Delvino & Spencer (2014).  
9 See a recent report on local authority responses to children and families with “no 
recourse to public funds” and the tensions that arise with the Home Office in relation 
to their immigration status: Price & Spencer (2015).  
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resistance, as in Germany, to measures requiring public officials to hand over 
personal details of service users. Elsewhere, cities quietly allow access to a 
service by refraining from checking the immigration status of service users 
or making provision indirectly through funding of NGOs. In so doing, they 
also face significant constraints on the extent to which they are allowed to 
use national – or EU – funds for that purpose. Where cities do not provide or 
fund access to essential services, civil society organisations can struggle to 
meet basic needs, or there is no provision at all. 
Cities want to talk 
Cities facing these challenges have opened a dialogue with each other – 
notably in a strand of work under the auspices of the Eurocities Working 
Group on Migration and Integration,10 in which their focus had earlier been 
limited to integration relating to migrants with regular status. They also, 
however, are keen to talk to the Commission, saying bluntly to the head of 
DG Home Affairs, at the Integrating Cities Conference in 2013, that there are 
undocumented migrants who live in our cities: 
...but officially to the eyes of the European Commission and the 
member states, they do not exist.  Nevertheless, we, local 
administrations are obliged to deal with this reality and deliver 
services for those persons when it is needed… 
We think that it is time for an exercise of ‘Realpolitik’ on the issue 
of undocumented migrants in Europe. We would like to discuss the 
issue with the European Commission but not only from the narrow 
perspective of the return directive or from the security point of 
view.11 
The EU’s agenda has not, in fact, been entirely control focused. The 
Directive on Victims’ Rights (2012/29/EU) significantly has a non-
discrimination clause relating to the victim’s residence status; while the 
earlier Returns Directive (2008/115/EC) on standards and procedures for 
returning irregular third-country nationals includes provisions on access to 
                                                     
10 See details of a two-day roundtable in October 2014 held to share experiences on 
the challenges they face, and to agree a forward work plan, 
www.compas.ox.ac.uk/globalexchange/city-responses-to-irregular-migrants/. 
11 Eurocities Working Group on Migration and Integration in a statement from the 
chair, Ramon Sanahuja, to the Director General of Home Affairs of the European 
Commission Stefano Manservisi on 10 September 2013, at the Integrating Cities 
Conference of Eurocities in Tampere. Text provided to the author. 
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emergency health care, treatment of illnesses and school education for those 
who are in the return procedure or cannot be removed. The Commission 
went further in welcoming guidance on apprehensions from the EU 
Fundamental Rights Agency that the police in member states should not seek 
to apprehend people near hospitals, schools or religious establishments; that 
medical and teaching staff should not be required to share migrants’ 
personal data with immigration authorities; and that parents with irregular 
status should be allowed to register the birth of their child without fear of 
arrest.12  
Clearly, there is thus some recognition that enforcement cannot be the 
only agenda if competing policy priorities, and responsibility to protect 
fundamental rights, are to be met. Yet there appears to be little discussion 
within the Commission on ways of addressing this challenge within broader 
policy agendas – in addressing poverty, cohesion or child protection for 
instance, in its review of the Facilitation Directive, or in relation to data 
protection safeguards that could ensure access to fundamental rights 
without the transfer of personal data to the immigration authorities. As UN 
Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants François Crépeau has advised:   
This ‘firewall’ should apply not only to labour inspectors, but also 
to other public servants migrants may be in touch with, such as the 
police, social workers, school personnel and health care 
professionals, as well as courts, tribunals and national human rights 
institutions. Migrants should be able to report abuse without fear of 
repercussions regarding their migration status.13 
Crucially for city authorities, the Commission also needs to reconsider 
its strategy and funding on the integration of migrants which remain 
exclusively tied to those with regular status. 
The reality is that there is an imperative for a certain level of inclusion, 
despite irregular status and despite the need for border controls. That reality 
needs to be recognised, discussed and catered to. Recognition at an EU level 
– and steps to include irregular migrants at least within protective measures, 
as in the Victims Directive, would facilitate dialogue on this - with the aim 
of finding a balance of measures across Europe that address the needs of all 
concerned. 
  
                                                     
12 Malström (2012). 
13 UN General Assembly Human Rights Council (2014), para 62.  
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 THE EUROPEAN FACILITATION 
DIRECTIVE AND THE 
CRIMINALISATION OF HUMANITARIAN 
ASSISTANCE TO IRREGULAR 
MIGRANTS: MEASURING THE IMPACT 
ON THE WHOLE COMMUNITY 
JENNIFER ALLSOPP 
his chapter addresses the effect on citizens and other individuals who 
possess a regular immigration status of laws and policies that 
criminalise the provision of humanitarian aid to third-country 
nationals with irregular immigration status. Three short case studies will be 
employed to argue that robust analysis of this under-researched impact of 
migration control policies is fundamental to formulating trust based-policy 
in this area. It is also argued that the impact of the criminalisation of 
migration on the whole community must be measured and taken into 
account as a key measure of policies which seek to combat irregular 
migration. The reasons for this are twofold: firstly, because the impact of 
these policies on communities affects their overall effectiveness; and 
secondly, because, as elucidated by the FIDUCIA research project, “public 
trust in justice is critically important for social regulation”.1 
                                                     
1 See FIDUCIA project website: www.fiduciaproject.eu/page/21. 
T 
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The Facilitation Directive 
One of the main pieces of European legislation which governs assistance to 
irregular migrants is the Facilitation Directive.2 Its related instrument is the 
Framework Decision.3 The Directive provides a common definition for the 
“facilitation of illegal immigration” and defines the following as 
infringements: i) assisting intentionally a non-EU country national to enter or 
transit through the territory of an EU country, in breach of laws; ii) assisting 
intentionally, and for financial gain, a non-EU country national to reside in the 
territory of an EU country, in breach of laws; and iii) instigating, assisting in 
or attempting to commit the above acts (own italics). 
Following the introduction of the Directive, EU member states were 
required to “adopt effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions” for 
these infringements. For the first infringement, where the aim is to provide 
humanitarian assistance, EU countries are not obliged to impose sanctions. 
However the recommendation of humanitarian exemption is not written 
into EU law.4 As such, countries have varied in how they have transposed 
this Directive into national legal frameworks. Currently, facilitating irregular 
entry is punished in all 28 EU member states. Yet a recent report by the EU 
Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA)5 reveals that only a quarter of member 
states “have national legislation that reflects, at least in some form, the 
safeguards in Article 1 (2), allowing states not to impose sanctions when 
irregular entry is facilitated for humanitarian purposes.”6 
The recent FRA report similarly notes that “more than a quarter of 
member states fail in their national legislation to exempt non-profit acts or 
humanitarian assistance from the rules of facilitation of stay”.7 More debate 
                                                     
2 European Council (2002a). 
3 European Council (2002b). 
4 Importantly, when it comes to those seeking asylum, the Framework Decision 
includes a safeguard for international protection. However, as a recent FRA report 
shows, this has been variably adopted by states in practice: see Fundamental Rights 
Agency (2014), p. 16. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., p. 15. Those that do employ safeguards employ different wordings. In 
Sweden, for example, when assessing punishment, special consideration is given to 
whether the crime was committed for reasons of “strong human compassion”. 
7 Ibid., p. 16. The FRA has previously called for a rewording of the Facilitation 
Directive to make exemption for humanitarian grounds compulsory and to protect 
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is required regarding the significant differences – from a citizen’s perspective 
– between facilitating irregular entry and transit and facilitating irregular 
stay.8 Meanwhile, the lack of a humanitarian exemption requirement has 
been the subject of ongoing criticism from scholars,9 European officials,10 EU 
institutions such as the FRA11 and NGO coalitions such as the European 
Migration Forum and Social Platform.12   
Despite the growing international interest in the criminalisation of 
migrants – in particular in the context of the current militaristic measures 
proposed by the EU to respond to the current Mediterranean refugee crisis – 
we still have little evidence of how immigration control impacts ‘regular’ 
members of the polity, including in relation to the Facilitation Directive and 
its transposition into national law. Most research, rather understandably, 
tends to focus on the impacts on the migrants who are the direct subject of 
                                                     
the right to rent to people with irregular immigration status, unless this is done for 
the sole purpose of preventing removal.  
8 This is raised in the UNHCR’s comments on the Directive, which advise that the 
‘for profit’ clause also be added to Article 1(a), alongside the introduction of a 
mandatory humanitarian clause. 
9 See e.g. Fekete (2009) and Webber (2008). 
10 In his 2010 report the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights raised 
the criminalisation of persons engaging with foreign nationals with irregular 
immigration status as a key concern: Council of Europe Commissioner for Human 
Rights (2010).  
11 Fundamental Rights Agency (2014).  
12 Following their January 2015 conference, the European Migration Forum 
concluded that there was a need to “revise the Facilitation Directive to exempt 
humanitarian assistance from criminalisation. The European Migration Forum 
called for it to explicitly exclude punishment for humanitarian assistance at entry 
(rescue at sea and assisting refugees to seek safety) as well as the provision of non-
profit humanitarian assistance (e.g. food, shelter, medical care, legal advice) to 
migrants in an irregular situation. It should also make clear, they argued, that 
renting accommodation to migrants in an irregular situation without the intention 
to prevent the migrant’s removal should not be considered facilitation of stay, while 
ensuring that the legal system punishes those persons who rent accommodation 
under exploitative conditions”. Meanwhile, Social Platform, the largest platform of 
European rights and value-based NGOs working in the social sector, has called for 
the  Facilitation Directive to be revised as follows: “member states shall not sanction 
those who provide humanitarian assistance to persons without EU citizenship”. See 
European Migration Forum (2015).  
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such policies. Yet what we do know that the way humanitarian actors, and 
also ordinary citizens, are impacted by this legislation – and related policies 
which seek to criminalise irregular migration – raises a range of important 
questions. The following three case studies highlight some of the difficulties 
and challenges borne by members of the polity who possess a regular 
immigration status when faced with the criminalisation of humanitarian aid 
to irregular migrants. The first concerns the threat to national identity and 
ideas of justice and citizenship; the second concerns the threat to subjective 
experiences of security; and the third concerns the threat to affective bonds.  
Case study 1 – a threat to national identity 
In 2011 a debate ignited in France surrounding what was known as a ‘crime 
of solidarity’.13 The debate concerned the way in which the Facilitation 
Directive had been transposed into French law without the recommended 
humanitarian exception clause, or ‘for-profit’ clause,14 leading to a public 
debate over citizens’ right to assist those in need. The debate was sparked by 
the arrest and prosecution of a range of ‘good Samaritans’ who were helping 
irregular migrants by providing food and shelter, or even charging their 
phones. A popular film, “Welcome”, which tackled this subject, also helped 
raise the profile of the debate. 
The debate was framed as a clash between French values: the law, 
advocates claimed, was an attack on the fundamental French principle of 
Fraternité – the right to help others in a brotherly spirit. Approximately 
30,000 people signed a petition to this effect. Meanwhile, the then Minister 
for Immigration argued that it was the obligation not to assist irregular 
migrants that embodied Fraternité and – by extension – national duty. In this 
way, the law brought about a very public tension between universalist and 
communitarian ideas of ‘national duty’ and what it meant to be a French 
citizen.15 As an NGO worker observed at the time: “[I]n general the French 
                                                     
13 See Allsopp (2012). 
14 This exemption was justified on the grounds that otherwise the Directive would 
exempt terrorist networks and spies. 
15 This fact of helping the vulnerable outsider as a citizen virtue is arguably a 
European value which became very apparent after the Second World War. It is very 
explicit in the hero status accorded to individuals who helped smuggle Jews to 
safety during the Holocaust. But in certain member states it appears that history is 
being forgotten. Raoul Wallenberg was a Swedish diplomat who saved tens of 
thousands of Jewish lives in Hungary by issuing passports and sheltering Jews in 
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don’t like immigration but this is a different question, a deeper question. It’s 
about citizens; it’s not a question of immigrants”. 
A proposed amendment to the law was rejected in 2009 – the vote was 
close but strictly along party political lines. But in December 2012 the 
majority Socialist government finally changed the law to clarify that it only 
related to acts which brought out a direct or indirect gain (the Directive ‘for 
profit clause’) and explicitly not to those related to “legal advice, the 
provision of food, shelter, medical care or any other act with the aim of 
preserving the dignity and physical integrity of the person”.  
The French example demonstrates the importance of not overlooking 
the impact of migration laws and policies on ordinary citizens. There are 
practical issues at stake but also significant ideological ones, since the 
parable of the Good Samaritan cuts right to the heart of how we see our 
national communities.16 The idea of solidarity is also a founding principle of 
the European Union. As such, this idea that helping irregular migrants in 
need as a common citizen’s right is an interesting one that merits wider 
consideration.17  
Case study 2 – a threat to individual security 
A second way in which members of the community with legal status are 
affected by laws which seek to criminalise irregular migrants is through their 
                                                     
buildings, for which he faced arrest and was ‘disappeared’. Wallenberg’s ‘good 
citizenship’ was recognised internationally in a very explicit way by his being 
granted honorary citizenship of the US (one of just seven people to have been 
granted this, along with Winston Churchill and Mother Teresa). He was also made 
an honorary citizen of Canada and Israel.  
16 See Grunwald-Spier (2012) for an interesting analysis of the wide range of reasons 
which motivate people to assist foreigners in need, even where there is no specific 
community link. The book includes a section which specifically addresses people’s 
motives for helping asylum seekers around the world today.  
17 The historical and ideological significance of this ‘civil disobedience’ element to 
laws which seek to restrict humanitarian aid to ‘illegals’ is finally starting to be 
addressed in scholarship. John Park (2013) draws links between the historical 
burden on ordinary US citizens to report errant slaves and their position vis-à-vis 
today’s irregular migrants. “Throughout American history,” he writes, “citizens 
have encountered people who are ‘illegal’ – that is, people who have no legal right 
to be in the United States or to freedom of movement because of their immigration 
status or race. Like Mark Twain’s Huckleberry Finn, these citizens face the conflict 
between sympathy for the unlawful other and the force of the law.” 
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subjective feelings of lack of trust and insecurity. This effect is more broad-
ranging in that it doesn’t just affect those in direct contact with irregular 
migrants, but the whole polity. A recent example from the UK provides an 
example of how subjective insecurity may be heightened in relation to the 
criminalisation of irregular migrants more generally.   
In summer 2013, the UK Home Office launched a range of measures to 
encourage irregular migrants to “go home or face arrest”. This included 
sending vans around a London borough with this slogan, a photo of 
handcuffs and the phone number of a “return hotline”. The Home Office 
operation also included spot checks at London underground stations, a 
poster campaign at care centres and hospitals. An ESRC funded study, “Go 
Home: mapping the unfolding controversy of Home Office immigration 
campaigns”18 was the result of its authors spending 18 months exploring the 
impact of such publicity campaigns on local communities. It found that the 
vans increased fear19 among all members of the community – including 
people who were concerned about migration. As well as concluding that the 
criminalisation campaign increased insecurity among the community, the 
researchers also reported a lack of trust in policy-makers: “[T]he vast 
majority of people we spoke to thought that the Home Office publicity was 
a political stunt rather than an effective policy – whatever their political 
stance on immigration”.20 
The findings of this research echo past research which has shown that 
even those members of the community who may on paper support 
crackdowns on irregular migration become insecure and fearful upon 
observing its implementation in practice, i.e. when it directly affects them, 
their rights and their everyday lives. This finding – that voters respond 
differently to immigration control enforcement measures at different stages 
of the policy cycle – has been documented by the academic Antje Ellermann 
in Germany.21 More research is needed to assess these unintended policy 
                                                     
18 See project website: http://mappingimmigrationcontroversy.com/. 
19 One individual commented. “I saw so many UKBA people they were there, I saw 
them with large dogs, blocking the entire area. I had a visa and have it now also. But 
I got really scared because I could see the place blocked…I got so panicked and 
scared that I went and sat in the wrong train…When I got on the train I started 
crying.” 
20 See http://mappingimmigrationcontroversy.com/findings/. 
21 See, e.g. Ellermann (2006). 
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consequences: the fear and subjective insecurity that come with 
criminalisation as it affects all members of the community. 
This aspect is especially important to the question of humanitarian 
assistance, since it is hypothesised (although remains to be evidenced fully) 
that policies that criminalise contact with irregular migrants may lead, to an 
even greater degree than do more general criminalisation strategies, to 
widespread feelings of subjective insecurity as well as stigma, mistrust and 
prejudice towards migrants.22 
Case study 3 – kinship and criminalisation  
The third way in which the transposition of the Facilitation Directive into 
national legislation may have an important impact on members of the 
community with citizenship or regular immigration status concerns family 
members, friends or kin of an irregular migrant in need. Frequently, those 
who end up providing assistance to irregular migrants are family or 
friends.23 This may increasingly be the case as a result of policies that 
promote intense social exclusion as a disincentive to remain and serve to 
isolate from society categories of irregular migrants such as refused asylum 
seekers.24 As migrants themselves, these ‘assisters’ are individuals who may 
already be marginalised.25  
The right to provide assistance and subsistence to family members is 
not explicit in the Facilitation Directive but is arguably covered in other 
instruments, e.g. Article 8 of ECHR and Article 7 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights on respect for private and family life.26 Some states, 
such as Austria, have been explicit in transposing the Directive that 
assistance provided to family members should not be punished. Similarly, 
                                                     
22 See, e.g. Webber (2008). See also Council of Europe Commissioner for Human 
Rights (2010) on the risk of hate crime and xenophobia.  
23 See, e.g. Ambrosini (2013); Bloch (2013). 
24 See, e.g. Bloch & Schuster (2005); Allsopp & Sigona (2014). 
25 European Council (2002b) provides that sanctions which can be applied to those 
who help irregular migrants include deportation, confiscation of transport and 
prohibition on practising the occupation in which the crime was committed. The 
mention of deportation suggests that the offence is likely to be committed by foreign 
nationals (see also Council of Europe Commissioner of Human Rights, 2010, supra). 
These suggested sanctions fall short and would benefit from revision along with the 
main Directive.  
26 Fundamental Rights Agency (2011). 
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the revised French law has made clear that the penalty does not concern close 
relatives of the migrant. 
Yet if the right to assist family members is often protected, what is 
more ambiguous is the status accorded to friendships, partners and 
individuals with other affective bonds. In the UK, it has been reported that 
former unaccompanied minors with immigration status have been forced to 
leave government-supported housing because they have unlawfully housed 
friends who have gone through the asylum system alongside them, but not 
received legal status and consequently ended up in destitution.27 The third 
and final point to consider, then, is how can and should the law protect 
affective bonds. What is the impact, from a trust- and adherence-based 
policy-making perspective, of policies which pit family ties and 
responsibilities against a risk of state criminalisation?  
Conclusions 
The case studies detailed above provide but a snapshot of existing evidence 
concerning the question of how the criminalisation of humanitarian 
assistance to irregular migrants affects communities at large. It can 
nevertheless inform the next phases of European migration policies in a 
number of ways. Firstly, as demonstrated in case studies 1 and 2, it is 
important to recognise that the criminalisation of migrants – and the 
criminalisation of humanitarian assistance in particular – restricts the rights 
of each member of a community and may, in so doing, affect trust in public 
institutions. One recommendation could be to implement a ‘public trust’ 
impact assessment when developing immigration laws and policies as a key 
measure of policies’ effectiveness. Secondly, as shown by case study 3, to 
avoid penalising subsections of society and undermining trust, laws and 
policies could make clear the extent of criminal liability for assisting irregular 
migrants and, specifically, how this varies according to the nature of the 
assistance and any affective bonds in play.28 
  
                                                     
27 On experiences of destitution, see Pinter (2012). 
28 This conclusion echoes that put forward in the FRA (2014) report. Best practice 
could also be drawn from the revised French legislation.  
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 TRAFFICKING:  
NOT A NEUTRAL CONCEPT 
RUTVICA ANDRIJASEVIC 
Introduction 
In 2000, at the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, the 
UN General Assembly adopted a definition of trafficking in persons. By 
September 2008, it had been signed by 117 states. This adoption set the basis 
for a common definition of trafficking which was much needed. Prior to the 
UN definition, there was not one agreed definition, and various 
governments, agencies and NGOs used different and often-conflicting 
definitions of trafficking. In this chapter I aim to problematise the notion of 
trafficking and show that contrary to common perceptions, trafficking is not 
a neutral term nor does it have the straightforward definition of an objective 
social phenomena. I argue that the term trafficking is informed by gendered 
and racialised norms and assumptions and that consequently only particular 
demographic groups, usually females and/or migrants, are conceived of as 
trafficked. Finally, by discussing the position of migrant domestic workers 
in the UK, I illustrate how norms and assumptions about gender and 
nationality affect the state’s legislative framework in unexpected ways so 
that measures designed to protect victims turn out to have exactly the 
opposite effect. Paradoxically, instead of empowering and protecting 
victims, anti-trafficking measures enhance victimisation and situations of 
‘unfree’ labour.     
Smuggling/trafficking distinction: A matter of gender 
For trafficking to be legally acknowledged, the three-elements chain, 
namely, the act (or recruitment, transportation), the means to enforce the act 
(threat, use of force), and the outcome (exploitation) need to be present. The 
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Convention distinguished trafficking from smuggling, where smuggling 
stands for facilitation and profiting from consensual albeit ‘illegal’ 
movement of persons across borders. As we can see, the two definitions rely 
on a neat separation between involuntary and non-consensual, i.e. 
trafficking, and voluntary and consensual, i.e. smuggling, processes of 
migration. Trafficking stands for an involuntary and non-consensual process 
where traffickers recruit and transport a person with the purpose of 
exploiting his/her labour at the destination. Smuggling, on the other hand, 
is a voluntary and consensual form of migration in which the smuggler’s role 
is restricted to facilitation of irregular border crossing. 
The distinction between smuggling and trafficking seems to be an 
unproblematic and straightforward one. Yet, if we take a second look at this 
distinction from the perspective of gender, we can observe that the definition 
of what we understand as smuggling and trafficking is informed by 
stereotypical images of femininity and masculinity. The fact that women are 
more likely to be identified as victims of trafficking has to do with gender 
stereotypes and views that men are primary migrants and breadwinners and 
women secondary migrants and men’s dependents. This view of migration 
has its origins in what became a dominant model to study migration. This 
model, based on guest workers’ mass labour migration to Germany between 
the 1950s and mid-1970s, is organised around the idea of distinct stages 
where the migratory process is initiated by single young men, and followed 
by older married men who are joined at a later stage by their spouses and 
children as a way of supplementing household income.  
This simplistic idea of migration rests on the classical dualism that 
identifies men with activity, production and the public sphere, and women 
with passivity, reproduction and the private sphere. This model heavily 
influenced migrant women’s positions as dependents with derived rights. 
This means that throughout the 1980s, immigration regulations in several 
European countries upheld a gendered division of labour by assigning 
women a ‘dependent’ status that kept many migrant women out of paid 
employment. This was done through family reunification schemes, which 
assumed that the man was the economically motivated migrant actor, the 
‘breadwinner’, and the woman was his dependent and a housewife 
(Morokvasic, 1984; Bhabha & Shutter, 1994). Hence, it is not only gender 
relations in migrants’ countries of origin that oppress women but also 
European immigration and labour regulations that position migrant women 
outside the formal labour market and paid employment.  
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Today, while formal immigration laws have changed so that in the EU 
migrant men and women have equal rights to family reunification, gendered 
coding of the labour markets still impacts differently on migrant women. 
Migrant women often work in sectors of the economy such as the domestic 
and caring sectors, where the temporality or informality of employment 
relationships, the level of income and the type of living arrangements make 
it difficult to satisfy the requirements of family reunification. The right of 
women who are EU nationals to reside with a non-EU husband and establish 
a family in the wife’s country of citizenship is still questioned in a way that 
the right of male EU citizens is not. A review of European legal decisions has 
shown that in cases when non-EU nationals are refused a residence permit 
or are under threat of deportation, national courts expect the wife to follow 
the husband to his country of citizenship, even in cases when the wife is an 
EU citizen (de Hart, 2007).  
Contrary then to the image of European states being liberal and 
progressive with respect to women’s place in society, the above discussion 
makes visible the extent to which gender stereotypes are embedded in the 
existing policies. In making the gendered aspects of these policies explicit, 
we can observe the role of gender norms and assumptions in shaping the 
conceptualisation of and demarcation between smuggling and trafficking. 
To say this differently, far from being a neutral definition of objective 
phenomena, the differentiation between smuggling and trafficking is 
gendered in that it is determined by historically and culturally codified 
images of femininity and masculinity.  
Victims of trafficking: A matter of nationality  
In recent years, the public debate on trafficking has slowly shifted from a 
nearly exclusive focus on trafficking for sexual exploitation to trafficking for 
forced labour. While this is a positive development in that the debate 
nowadays incorporates a much broader spectrum of sectors in which forced 
labour takes place, what is problematic is the tendency to view trafficking 
for the sex sector as a separate and distinct form of exploitation that is more 
related to matters of violence against women than those of labour. Such 
separation is misleading in that it conceals that the figure of the victim of 
trafficking is deeply embedded in debates on voluntary versus forced 
prostitution that led to a racialisation of the two categories.     
The process of negotiating the Trafficking Protocol was, in the words 
of Anne Gallagher (2001), “an unusual affair”. If the crime prevention system 
of the UN is usually of no interest to the international non-governmental 
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community, on this occasion the Commission on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice had to deal with unprecedented levels of NGO 
interventions. The bulk of these were advanced by feminist NGOs and their 
interventions concentrated on the issue of prostitution. There were two main 
coalitions to the contention. The first one, the Human Rights Caucus, stood 
by the position that prostitution is a form of legitimate labour. The second 
one, the International Human Rights Network, was adamant that 
prostitution be seen as a violation of women’s human rights. The former 
group maintained that along with work in the agriculture or garment 
industry, sex work is a form of globalised low-wage labour and insisted that 
trafficking should not be associated with prostitution per se but only with 
situations which contain elements of labour abuse, such as forced labour, 
slavery or servitude (Doezema, 2001). The latter group maintained that all 
prostitution is coerced and the result of male oppression and dominance 
over women (for an overview of contrasting debates see ATR, 2015). 
Consequently, these debates engendered the dualism between forced 
and voluntary prostitution. In the European context, due to the overlap of 
debate on trafficking and irregular migration, this differentiation resulted in 
racialising of the categories of voluntary and forced prostitution. This entails 
that consensual prostitution is assumed to be performed by Western sex 
workers capable of self-determination while situations of coerced 
prostitution, on the contrary, are seen to apply to passive and inexperienced 
black and migrant women. These considerations are important on two 
accounts. Firstly, the differentiation between innocent victims and voluntary 
sex workers brings about different access to rights as states devise schemes 
aimed at assisting victims of trafficking but not sex workers who find 
themselves in exploitative working conditions. Moreover, those who fall out 
of the category of the ‘proper’ victim are denied legal protection and become 
vulnerable to deportation (Crowhurst, 2007). Secondly, identifying migrant 
and black women primarily as victims reinforces stereotypes about migrant 
women as passive and dependent and contrasts them relative to (white) 
European women who are identified as autonomous agents. As such, the 
concept of the trafficking victims is to be understood as the opposite to that 
of an EU citizen (Andrijasevic, 2010).  
The effects of stereotypes in law  
In the UK, the discussion on the Modern Slavery Bill to protect overseas 
domestic workers illustrates well how shortcomings of law might be linked 
to stereotypical gendered representation. In March 2015, the government 
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proposed amendments to the existing Bill concerning domestic workers who 
have been determined to be victims of slavery or trafficking. Current law 
grants one year discretionary leave to those who have been found to be 
victims of slavery or trafficking, allows them recourse to public funds, and 
permits them to take up any job, including but not limited to domestic work. 
The government’s proposed amendment shortens the discretionary leave 
period to six months, prohibits recourse to public funds, and ties victims to 
the domestic sector, as they are entitled to work only as an overseas domestic 
worker (ILPA, 2015). Despite the existing evidence that the right to change 
employers lessens the abuse experienced by domestic workers and that since 
the introduction of the tied visa system in 2012, allowing entry only on a six-
month non-renewable visa with a named employer, fewer workers have 
reported abuse due to the fear of being deported and criminalised for 
escaping their employers (Kalayaan, 2011), the government maintained that 
the proposed amendment is better suited to protect domestic workers and 
encourage them to come forward to seek help. Moreover, the government 
also maintained that were domestic workers able to apply to renew their 
visa, they could be exploited for longer (Kalayaan, 2015).  
As we can see through its existing laws, the government ties migrant 
domestic workers to the employer. Informed by the idea that domestic work 
is integral to the functioning of the household and as such not part of the 
formal labour market, the existing immigration rules effectively bind a 
migrant domestic worker to the employer. The proposed amendment 
exacerbates this situation further in that it prohibits victims of abusive 
employment relationships to work anywhere else but in the domestic sector. 
Paradoxically, then, while claiming to protect them, the government makes 
migrant domestic workers invisible and treats them as abject victims whose 
situation can be improved only through a combination of rescue and 
prosecution. This logic of the state as an appropriate protector is upheld by 
stereotypical expectations of women’s dependent role in the household and 
about migrant women as passive victims of forced labour or trafficking. This 
logic is deeply problematic in that the state is implicated in facilitating 
exploitation through its immigration controls and practices (Anderson, 
2012). Hence, instead of conceiving of the state simply as the key actor in 
combatting trafficking, a perspective that takes into consideration the 
intersection of gender and nationality reveals the extent to which the state’s 
anti-trafficking laws are embedded in stereotypical assumptions about 
migrant women and the ways in which these assumptions are contributing 
to enhancing migrants’ vulnerability to exploitation and facilitating forced 
labour.   
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 THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
TRAFFICKING AND IRREGULAR 
MIGRATION 
ANGELIKI DIMITRIADI 
n 13 May 2015 the Commission released the European Agenda on 
Migration. The Agenda expressly states that though migrant 
smuggling and trafficking are two diverse criminal activities 
perpetrated by criminal networks, they are also interlinked since persons 
who start their journeys in a voluntary manner can also be vulnerable to 
networks of labour or sexual exploitation.1   
The discussion regarding smuggling and trafficking is not new. Both 
activities have evolved into lucrative businesses, continuously growing in 
size and income. In the European Union, following a series of widely 
publicised incidents and the increase in recorded deaths in the 
Mediterranean since 2013 and particularly in the last year,2 human 
smuggling has risen on the agenda as a critical issue in the management of 
irregular migration.   
Irregular migratory flows are not comprised of clear-cut categories of 
migrants. Global socio-economic inequality, political instability, 
environmental hazards, conflict and absence of safety or simply sheer 
poverty generate migration. The flows include forced migrants, economic 
migrants, asylum seekers, and vulnerable categories such as unaccompanied 
minors or single-parent families. Whether moving in search of safety or 
better economic prospects, a space has emerged that overrides national 
boundaries, in which various actors become involved in services 
                                                     
1 European Commission (2015).  
2 The IOM said the 3,072 deaths made Europe the most dangerous destination for 
‘irregular’ migrants in 2014. See Brian & Laczko (2014).  
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(recruitment, transport, document procurement, etc.) that fundamentally 
exploit (and profit from) the desire to migrate in search of a better life. In this 
space, smuggling and trafficking meet at specific points that relate to the 
journey (route) and the intermediaries involved. When a shift takes place, it 
is from smuggling to trafficking.  
Smuggling can become trafficking, en route or on arrival, depending on 
the nature of the business model the smugglers have adopted. The UNODC 
Global Review on Smuggling of Migrants (2010) concluded that smuggling 
networks function according to the “enterprise” model and sophisticated 
networks have replaced small-scale businesses in regions where anti-
smuggling law enforcement strategies are particularly robust. Yet, along the 
Greek-Turkish border for example, since 2010 different modus operandi and 
types of smuggling operations have appeared, depending on nationality of 
smuggled migrants, their purpose (employment or asylum), cost, etc. By 
treating smuggling as an organised process to the level of trafficking, we risk 
missing a significant part of the model, which is more fluid and adaptable 
and less structured. In fact, by comparing the smuggling and trafficking, one 
could reach some interesting observations. 
Trafficking is an entirely organised criminal activity,3 often with 
pyramid-shaped structures. Smuggling, on the other hand, has different 
shapes and forms. It ranges from a transnationally organised criminal 
network to an ad-hoc operation in border towns by smugglers seeking to 
profit from facilitating the passage of a few migrants. From debt bondage, 
forced labour conditions, usually in the agriculture, construction, and 
sweatshop industries, to sexual exploitation, smuggled migrants are already 
vulnerable due to their ‘irregular’ status and can be subjected to trafficking. 
In both cases the relationship between demand and supply is intrinsic, while 
remaining ambivalent.  
In the case of smuggling, the relationship is essentially based on 
mutual agreement, with the smuggler providing a service for which he/she 
will not be paid unless the migrant reaches the final destination. Thus, an 
element of control, albeit limited, remains in the hands of the migrants. In 
the case of trafficked person, any potential element of control is an illusion, 
since the intent is from the beginning to exploit, thus the relationship is 
entirely unequal.  
                                                     
3 For the exact definitions see United Nations (2002a) (‘the Smuggling Protocol’) and 
United Nations (2002b) (‘the Trafficking Protocol’). 
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If trafficking is pyramid-shaped, with hierarchies and pre-allocated 
roles, smuggling is closer to a set of links that attach and disengage 
depending on the modus operandi and monetary compensation offered. 
These links are the intermediaries, i.e. the individuals, who are neither 
bound to the smuggling or the trafficking operations but perform activities 
for both. Skeldon (2000) pointed to the transition from smuggling to 
trafficking and the role of the intermediaries, when he attempted to describe 
both processes as a “continuum of facilitation”, spanning the divide from 
“completely transparent, fully invoiced and accountable recruitment on the 
one hand, through to the movement of people through networks entirely 
controlled by criminal gangs on the other.”4 In this continuum, a series of 
facilitators or intermediaries become involved, who are neither part of the 
trafficking network nor the smuggling ring. They offer diverse services such 
as housing, mobile phones, document procurement, information on routes, 
and bribes. They work with both smugglers and traffickers and they 
contribute to the blurring of the boundaries between one and the other, 
creating a relationship between the two that can also enable smuggling to 
transform, eventually, into trafficking.   
We can identify these linkages, across various stages, from recruitment 
to the monetary transaction.  
Recruitment is a common first step to both trafficking and smuggling, 
though again it is dependent on context and migrant aspirations. Irrespective 
of whether an individual seeks to migrate in search of employment or safety, 
the recruiter (who can work for smugglers and/or traffickers) tends to 
generate ‘imperfect information’.5 Both smugglers and traffickers ‘recruit’ 
individuals, usually with false promises of employment opportunities, a 
better life and safety. In the case of trafficked persons, until such time as 
coercion begins, they can in fact be considered smuggled immigrants, since 
they are aware of the irregular journey they will undertake but unaware of 
the deception on the part of the recruiter. Rather, the misinformation is a way 
of securing consent for the first leg of the journey. Smugglers, research has 
shown, also transmit incomplete information.  
The misinformation usually focuses on the type of vessels and 
transport means, duration of the journey, dangers and reception conditions 
and asylum in the country of destination. Transport means vary depending 
on the route. For example, for migrants and asylum-seekers who attempt to 
                                                     
4 Skeldon (2000). 
5 Bilger et al. (2006). 
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reach the EU via Turkey, routes are limited to either by sea to Greece or by 
land to Bulgaria. The journey is rarely organised from beginning to end and 
migrants find smugglers on arrival in Turkey. The duration of migrants’ stay 
depends on two things: their means of travel and the amount to be paid to 
the smuggler. For those attempting to cross the maritime border, the waiting 
can last from a few days to months and in some cases years, depending on 
the number of people a smuggler can take on the boat, payment, weather 
conditions, etc. With the exception of those who pay for specific vessels, e.g. 
on average pleasure boats carry seven passengers at a cost of €7,000-12,000 
each depending on nationality, age and urgency,6 most migrants state upon 
arrival in Greece to NGOs, or during screening, that they had agreed and 
paid for a very different type of travel or that they refused to board the vessel 
and were in fact forced by the smugglers.  
Further complicating factors are those involved in the transport phase; 
the truck driver or skipper may or may not be part of an organised ‘fixed’ 
network. They may also be freelancers, offering services to those procuring 
them. They may transport irregular migrants across borders or within a 
country; recommend another driver or skipper or even a smuggler to 
continue the journey; transport trafficking victims unaware of the 
exploitation to follow; or be part of a set smuggling ring that operates along 
a specific route and undertakes the transport of persons.  
Routes and means of transport thus overlap and this is where the 
intermediaries play a critical role. Smuggling and trafficking, particularly of 
irregular migrants, tend to follow the same routes: the Eastern Route, the 
Central European Route, the Eastern Mediterranean Route and the South-
eastern Mediterranean Route. The countries of destination are also largely 
similar for irregular migrants and trafficked persons: Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom are 
the main destination countries in Europe of irregular migrants. In most cases, 
smugglers and traffickers often adopt the same routes and transportation 
methods in order for clients and victims to travel together. This means that 
mixed migrant flows include trafficked persons along with smuggled 
individuals and it is often impossible to distinguish one from the other 
without individual screening. Even then, distinction can be difficult because 
trafficked persons who are transported with irregular migrants are often not 
                                                     
6 Certain nationalities pay more than others, e.g. Syrians are charged more than 
Afghans. If the migrant is in a hurry to undertake the journey, often the smuggler 
will charge more. For further information, see Dimitriadi (2015).  
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aware they will be trafficked, i.e. they operate under the assumption that 
they are being smuggled into the country.  
Along this continuum of facilitation, perhaps the most critical role is 
played by those responsible for the monetary transaction. The financial 
element is crucial in smuggling operations for two reasons. On the one hand, 
it ‘guarantees’ the business side of the transaction, whereby both will profit 
via the arrival of the migrant to the pre-agreed destination. Unless the 
migrant arrives, the smuggler will not receive his payment. On the other 
hand, it is the required sum the migrant has to pay that largely determines 
the journey and its risks. There are different rates regarding departure from 
different countries, and depending on the destination, and there are different 
rates for families and for minors but also for nationalities and level of border 
control. Low risk routes are usually low cost; high risk routes tend to be high 
cost. Transactions take place via the hawala (informal banking) system. 
Because it is informal and thus untraceable, it is the preferred method of 
financial transaction of most organised criminal activities, from trafficking 
to terrorist networking. As cash-intensive businesses, using cash couriers, 
hawala networks incorporate their own intermediaries who recommend the 
business owner to smugglers and/or traffickers. Due to the nature of the 
business, hawala shops function as banks open to all who require cash 
transactions. Thus, they are used by migrants, smugglers and traffickers 
alike, which mean they represent a critical link between smuggling and 
trafficking. 
Smuggling of irregular migrants and trafficking are demand-based 
businesses. Though legal instruments have been created to distinguish the 
two and point out the element of consent as critical in differentiating one 
from the other, there is a growing interrelationship between the two. There 
is also a continuous evolution of smuggling, which increasingly adopts 
harsher methods and practices resembling trafficking. Migrants along the 
Mediterranean route are reporting being forced to embark on unsafe vessels 
despite their objection, harassment and violence during the journey, criminal 
gangs controlling border areas, demanding additional payment and 
exploiting those unable to pay. Routes, modes of transport, money shops, 
countries of origin and destination increasingly overlap. This is not 
surprising considering the changing face of migration; no longer linear or 
clear cut, people now move for multiple reasons and this widens the scope 
for smuggling and trafficking to meet.   
Nonetheless, we still lack a deeper understanding of the business 
structure of the two activities, their differences and intersections. In order to 
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propose evidence-based policies we need to understand the different forms 
of smuggling operations, the diverse regional and local contexts, the adapted 
business models and the ways intermediaries engage and disengage 
themselves between smuggling and trafficking. Smuggling of irregular 
migrants is a particularly fluid activity, constantly adjusting to the 
geopolitical context, border controls and demands both in countries of origin 
and destination. Our policies need to provide a flexible framework to meet 
the challenges of increasing human mobility; this requires closer 
collaboration between researchers and policy-makers. More important, 
immigration policies need to go beyond simple categorisation, and devote 
more attention to regional and local specificities of the phenomenon in order 
to ensure the protection of individuals and those in need.  
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 IRREGULAR MIGRATION, TRAFFICKING 
IN PERSONS AND PREVENTION OF 
EXPLOITATION 
ANNIINA JOKINEN 
rafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants are two distinct 
crimes that frequently occur in the context of irregular migration. In 
practice, smuggling of migrants and trafficking overlap at times and 
there are several cross-cutting themes associated with both. Given their 
clandestine nature, and the complexities of migration flows, it is difficult to 
estimate how many irregular migrants use the services of smugglers, how 
many are trafficked or how many smuggled persons end up being trafficked. 
It is also unclear to what degree certain smuggling and trafficking 
organisations overlap and merge their operations with one another. This is a 
major gap in knowledge and would warrant more research.  
Whether smuggled or trafficked, during and after their journey, 
migrants are often exposed to violations of their fundamental rights, abuse, 
crime, exploitation and even life-threatening conditions. The vulnerability of 
smuggled migrants, in particular debt, exposes them to traffickers and 
exploiters, especially during transit and at the country of destination. Paying 
back the debt incurred by the ‘smuggling service’ increases the desperation 
of migrants and they may end up in situations of forced labour, forced 
prostitution or labour exploitation. 
Trafficking in persons, on the other hand, is by its nature a process 
rather than a single event, and as such the situation of a single victim may 
also change over both time and a continuum of different levels of 
exploitation. What at the beginning is less serious exploitation can later turn 
into a situation of trafficking. Therefore, over time a smuggled person may 
become a victim of trafficking, as their circumstances change in the country 
of destination.  
T 
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It is, however, very important to point out that victims of trafficking 
may have different residence statuses. They can be undocumented 
(irregular) migrants, but EU citizens or third-country nationals with valid 
residence permits can also end up in situations of trafficking and 
exploitation.1 Indeed, according to Eurostat,2 at the European level as many 
as 65% of registered victims of trafficking are EU citizens. On the other hand, 
for example in Finland, most trafficking victims are third-country nationals 
with valid work permits, as the majority of detected trafficking cases in 
Finland have been related to labour trafficking.3  
However, often irregular migrants face the highest risk of exploitation 
because of their vulnerable, even clandestine status, which is exploited by 
traffickers and other criminals, including in the clandestine job market. This 
is because undocumented migrants find it very difficult to contact 
authorities or seek help from governmental institutions.4 Identification of 
victims of trafficking among undocumented and/or smuggled migrants 
seems to be especially challenging because of the lack of trust between 
migrants and authorities, and because of the lack of awareness of trafficking 
in the first place.  
However, it must be pointed out that the problem of trafficking and 
exploitation of migrants cannot be solved only by resorting to the criminal 
justice system and penal frameworks. Indeed, there are a number of 
alternative means of addressing human trafficking other than through 
strengthening the penal framework.  
There is considerable potential in utilising different trust-based 
policies. In the FIDUCIA project, four distinct dimensions of trust were 
identified: (a) trust between victims and the authorities/social workers; (b) 
trust between victims and their clients (in particular in sexual exploitation); 
(c) trust between the clients of victims and the authorities/social workers; 
and (d) trust between victims and traffickers.5 The evidence shows an 
alarming lack of trust particularly between victims and the authorities. This 
negatively impacts the identification of victims. Police units may misidentify 
trafficking victims as undocumented migrants and/or offenders and fail to 
prevent secondary victimisation. Trust-based policies could be adopted to 
                                                     
1 For example, FRA (2015). 
2 Eurostat (2014). 
3 Ollus & Jokinen (2013); Jokinen et al. (2011). 
4 Ollus & Jokinen (2013). 
5 FIDUCIA (2015). 
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disseminate information within migrant communities and networks 
regarding the rights of migrants and the services offered by NGOs, trade 
unions and the authorities. By increasing trust between victims and the 
authorities, victims can be encouraged to seek help and report their cases to 
the authorities in the first place. This would allow increased detection of 
cases and would then help the authorities to gather better evidence in order 
to secure convictions for human trafficking. EU member states should also 
devise strategies that will reduce the level of corruption and increase the 
efficiency and fairness of institutions. Past negative experiences, e.g. in the 
victims’ home countries, may hinder the creation of trust in the destination 
country.  
Similarly, EU member states should improve the training of officials 
and other professionals likely to come into contact with victims and potential 
victims, e.g. labour inspectors, police and border guards. Rather than 
focusing only on a person’s migration status, the monitoring and 
enforcement activities should aim at providing information and protecting 
the fundamental rights of migrants at work and at preventing their abuse 
and exploitation.6  
Overall, EU member states should promote tolerance, trust and non-
discrimination in order to foster a culture and a normative climate that 
promotes understanding and appreciation of the positive social and 
economic contribution of migrant workers to the society of their host 
country.7 The member states of the EU should mobilise efforts and public 
attitudes to combat discriminatory and xenophobic attitudes, and prioritise 
the protection of migrant workers over immigration controls. Ultimately, 
criminalisation of migration really just reinforces negative stereotypes 
against migrants and makes them even more vulnerable to exploitation at 
the hands of traffickers and exploiters, who can exercise even more control 
over their victims because of the fear that victims have of arrest and 
expulsion. 
As regards the issue of labour trafficking, EU member states should 
also focus on the role of businesses in the prevention of trafficking and 
labour exploitation and on the promotion of the self-regulation of businesses 
during recruitment as well as in the workplace and in the labour supply 
chains, in order to combat labour exploitation. EU member states should also 
ensure that when purchasing goods, works and services, all public sector 
                                                     
6 Sorrentino & Jokinen (2014). 
7 Ibid.  
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organisations, including state-owned, state-controlled or state-supported 
enterprises, have in place appropriate due-diligence procedures to guarantee 
respect for human rights and labour rights and to prevent exploitation and 
trafficking of migrant workers, i.e. by corrupt companies, or unscrupulous 
recruitment agencies, labour brokers or outsourcing companies.8 
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 ALTERNATIVE WAYS TO ADDRESS 
HUMAN TRAFFICKING: TECHNOLOGY 
AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
JULIA MURASZKIEWICZ 
Introduction: Technology and human trafficking 
Trafficking in human beings is a fast-growing transnational crime, affecting 
all parts of the world.1 Despite the pervasiveness of the issue of human 
trafficking, for a long time it remained outside the discourses on technology. 
This paper takes “technology” to mean machinery, devices, algorithms and 
methodologies developed from scientific knowledge for specific purposes, 
including tools or ways of communicating and tracking, such as mobile 
phones, landline phones, tablets, social networking sites, databases, 
surveillance devices, etc., as well as deep data analysis tools and methods 
such as data mining and big data. 
Technology is a double-edged sword: today an accumulative number 
of technologies play a significant role in fighting and facilitating human 
trafficking. From technologies that enable traffickers to communicate with 
their victims, e.g., mobile phones and the Internet, to technologies that 
enable traffickers to recruit their victims, e.g., online job adverts, dating 
websites and social media, to technologies that help prevent human 
trafficking, e.g., online awareness raising campaigns, to tools used to combat 
the crime by law enforcement officials, e.g., drones, financial tracking, 
infrared or phone-tapping.  
With such a vast array of technologies it is necessary to take consider 
how our understanding of the role that technology has to play in the crime 
                                                     
1 Shelley (2010). 
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of human trafficking and its prevention can fit into European legislation and 
policy.  
The element of technology is absent from the currently in force 2011 
EU Directive on Human Trafficking.2 However, it is acknowledged that the 
Internet and social networks are reflected on in the EU Strategy towards the 
Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings, adopted in 2012. The document 
highlights that “internet and social networks will be used as a means of 
effectively raising awareness in a targeted manner”.3 
Undeniably, the turning point appears to have come with an increasing 
number of researchers devoting themselves to the relationship between 
various elements of technology and human trafficking. In 2014 the EU-
funded TRACE project began; one of its primary aims is to assess how those 
fighting the crime are using technology and also how the perpetrators are 
furthering their crimes by the use of technology. Correspondingly, the 
‘datACT’ project has committed itself to looking at the relationship between 
victims of human trafficking and data protection, an arm of technology. 
DatACT strives to ensure that victims of trafficking are “perceived in their 
autonomy and not as powerless victims whose personal data must be 
collected and stored.”  
This paper considers merely two of the many nexuses between human 
trafficking and technology, and serves as an introduction to the issue for 
policy-makers. In the second section I argue for increasing awareness of the 
digital footprint, both in combating human trafficking and protecting 
victims. The third section introduces the debates around data protection and 
privacy and human trafficking, and encourages further research and greater 
focus on this domain.  
Internet and the digital footprint 
The Internet is the ideal channel through which one can engage in all three 
stages of human trafficking:  
 action (recruitment);  
 a means (threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, abduction, 
fraud, deception, abuse of power or position of vulnerability, or giving 
                                                     
2 European Parliament and Council (2011).  
3 European Commission (2012), p. 9.  
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or receiving payments or benefits to obtain the consent of a person who 
has control over another person); and  
 exploitation.  
Research from the TRACE project revealed that:  
In Latvia, recruitment most often takes place via social network 
websites, such as draugiem.lv or facebook.com, where with one 
click an unknown person becomes ‘approved’ as a friend. These 
websites provides a platform for sharing details of our everyday life 
and the opportunity to display emotion publicly, which makes it 
easy to observe and approach a potential victim who shows signs of 
being in a vulnerable emotional state... Although interaction on the 
Internet may be between people of different generations, trust can 
be established very quickly.4 
The Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism 
highlighted that “the methods used by traffickers to recruit through the 
Internet include: 
 The use of false advertisements for jobs, marriages, lonely hearts, etc. 
 The use of online chat rooms.”5 
As for exploitation, this can be done through the posting of 
pornographic images/videos of victims on various websites.6 “Sometimes 
acts of prostitution are filmed without the consent of the victim and 
distributed. On other occasions victims are trafficked for the sole purpose of 
porn production”.7 To borrow from Dettmeijer-Vermeulen,8 “[I]mages of 
sexual acts with victims circulating on the Internet constitute a new 
dimension to victimhood.”9 
In view of the role the Internet can play in facilitating human 
trafficking, research should be undertaken to discover how clients can be 
made aware of risks of online offers, either for jobs or to satisfy sexual wants.  
In a parallel way, the Internet can make a significant contribution to 
combating human trafficking and prosecuting those responsible. In 
                                                     
4 Sapens et al. (2014), p. 31.  
5 Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism (2010), p. 129. 
6 Farley (2007), p. 153. 
7 Covenant Eyes (2011). 
8 The Dutch National Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings and Sexual 
Violence against Children. 
9 Dettmeijer-Vermeulen (2012), p. 301. 
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particular, the digital footprint can be helpful. In brief, the digital footprint 
is the trail one leaves behind every time he/she accesses the Internet; unlike 
a paper trail, the digital footprint is harder to destroy. By studying digital 
activity of suspects, law enforcement can obtain more than just the Internet 
service provider address. Indeed, websites, including social networking 
sites, keep tabs on all activity. All information, including dates, can be traced 
provided the request for information conforms to the requirements of 
national legislation. As such, strong recommendations are made for the 
establishment of a partnership with social networks. 
It is therefore recommended in this paper that future EU strategies on 
human trafficking take into account the possibilities that the Internet can 
offer to conduct investigations and prosecutions. Moreover, there is a need 
for law enforcement persons to obtain up-to-date knowledge on how to use 
social networking sites as a form of intelligence in the fight against 
trafficking in human beings. Attention must be paid to the role of (popular) 
social networking sites and their capacity to facilitate trafficking in human 
beings. Such awareness can help to increase law enforcement’s capacity to 
monitor and track the role of social networking sites in trafficking in human 
beings. 
On the other side of the coin lies the notion that human traffickers can 
use the digital footprint to prey on their victims. For example, if a victim is 
using a social networking service whilst in a safe house he/she may not 
realise that the location from which a post or status was published is often 
publicly disclosed by the website. This in turn has significant consequences 
with regard to the victim’s security.  
Importantly, the solution is not to take technology out of the hands of 
the victims. Instead, victims need safe access to technology, whether phones 
or the Internet, whilst learning how these technologies can be used against 
them. It is therefore recommended that policy-makers consider the need for 
staff who can work with victims accordingly.  
Data protection and privacy  
The system of fighting human trafficking includes collecting information 
and data. To borrow from Rankin and Kinsella: 
To successfully combat THB [trafficking in human beings] it is 
necessary to enhance data collection to promote trans-border 
cooperation, develop a capacity to collect, analyse and ultimately 
share relevant THB information and data. Knowledge can take the 
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form of either intelligence or data and understanding THB is central 
to tackling the problem more effectively. Knowledge, from 
whatever source, is a key requirement in the architecture of that 
response.10 
An example of collected data is the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC) online “Human Trafficking Case Law Database”, a 
publicly available repository of summaries and full court documents of past 
trafficking cases to refer to in support of current trafficking cases. The type 
of national data collection is a function of the various national reporting 
mechanisms, which can include victim data.11  
However, information on human trafficking cannot be gathered at the 
expense of the safety and privacy of human trafficking victims. This paper 
therefore calls for the continued focus on developing frameworks that 
protect the privacy of such victims. 
Globally, there is an array laws on data protection and privacy laws, 
including Article 8 ECHR, which addresses the right to respect for private 
and family life. At a European Union level, the Data Protection Directive12 is 
a significant piece of legislation. For victims, of particular importance is the 
Victims Directive,13 which in Article 21 grants victims the right to protection 
of privacy by asking member states to ensure: 
That competent authorities may take during the criminal 
proceedings appropriate measures to protect the privacy, including 
personal characteristics of the victim taken into account in the 
individual assessment provided for under Article 22, and images of 
victims and of their family members. Furthermore, member states 
shall ensure that competent authorities may take all lawful 
measures to prevent public dissemination of any information that 
could lead to the identification of a child victim. 
The above-cited Article is minimalistic in character, if only because it 
limits the protection of victim privacy only during criminal proceedings. As 
such, the protection is inadequate. What happens to victims – and their data 
– in safe houses and in recovery programmes?  
Moreover, EU legislation has only one reference to an obligation of the 
state with regard to human trafficking and data protection and privacy. The 
                                                     
10 Kinsella & Rankin (2011), p. 172. 
11 Wijers (2013), p. 1. 
12 European Parliament & Council (1995). 
13 European Parliament & Council (2012).  
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Recital to 2011 EU Directive on Human Trafficking states at paragraph 33 
that the Directive respects fundamental rights and observes the principles 
recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, including the protection of personal data. 
The EU strategy does not mention data protection or privacy, and only 
talks of the need to improve data collection, analysis and exchange of 
information to promote and assist in information sharing. Victim protection 
is missing.  
As highlighted by Wijers, there remains little awareness and 
knowledge amongst staff combating human trafficking and working in 
victim protection of what data protection laws are or require.14 This is a 
concern. Privacy and protection risks attached to the collection of data when 
it comes to human trafficking are great, for we are dealing with the safety of 
a particular vulnerable group of individuals. Despite the fact that risks are 
evident, the current legal and policy approach is limited and further 
direction ought to be provided to member states. Consideration should also 
be given to the development of EU soft law materials that promote ethical 
research and data collection. An example of such material is the UNODC 
toolkit on “Use of standardized data collection instruments or the United 
Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking, Guide to ethics and 
human rights in counter trafficking”.15 
Major conclusions and follow-up 
1. Developments in technology increasingly play a role in the both 
committing and preventing human trafficking. There is a need for 
further research and training on how technology methods and tools, 
such as the Internet and mobile technologies, can be used.  
2. The basic standard for data and privacy protection of victims of crime 
in the European Union member countries is currently determined by 
the Victims Directive. However, the obligations threshold is not 
particularly high. There is an urgent need to develop a comprehensive 
and consistent legal framework and practical procedures on data 
protection, privacy and protecting human trafficking victims. The 
matter should be considered in the future EU strategy on human 
trafficking. 
                                                     
14 Wijers (2013).  
15 UNODC (2010).  
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 THE EU ANTI-SMUGGLING 
FRAMEWORK: DIRECT AND INDIRECT 
EFFECTS ON THE PROVISION OF 
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO 
IRREGULAR MIGRANTS 
JENNIFER ALLSOPP AND  
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Introduction 
The rise in the number of refugees and migrants attempting to cross Europe’s 
borders in 2015, and the increasing number of fatalities and heightened peril 
affecting these individuals, have been a catalyst for concerted EU action 
regarding the phenomenon of migration and for renewed efforts towards the 
building of a common immigration policy. The issue of facilitating the entry, 
transit and stay of irregular migrants has been politicised both at the EU’s 
external borders and within member states. While migrants remain in transit 
in areas such as Calais, Ventimiglia and the Serbian-Croatian border, often 
seeking out the services of smugglers to cross into neighbouring states to 
reunite with family members or to fulfil a personal migration goal, 
humanitarian actors seek to respond to their human rights and needs in an 
increasingly ambiguous, punitive and militarised environment. Within 
many EU member states, the backdrop of austerity and cuts to public 
services has placed local authorities and civil society actors in a difficult 
position as they seek to respond to the basic needs of newly arrived and 
established migrants with fewer resources. 
A range of common EU legal instruments, primarily the “Facilitators’ 
Package”, serve to regulate this area. In the European Commission’s 2015 
82  ALLSOPP & MANIERI 
 
European Agenda on Migration,1 the “fight against smugglers and 
traffickers” was identified as a key priority. In particular, the Agenda called 
for improvements to the current EU legal framework “to tackle migrant 
smuggling and those who profit from it”. However, in the EU Action Plan 
against Migrant Smuggling2 adopted in May 2015, the European 
Commission notes that appropriate criminal sanctions should be in place 
while avoiding the risks of criminalising those who provide humanitarian 
assistance to migrants in distress, thus implicitly acknowledging the 
inherent tension between the criminalisation of smugglers on the one hand 
and of those providing humanitarian assistance on the other, through a 
range of behaviours that cover facilitation of not only irregular entry and 
transit but also irregular residence and stay. 
For the past decade, service providers across several member states 
have raised concerns that the hardening stance on migrant smuggling at the 
political level could impact the day-to-day service provision of everyday 
humanitarian actors. They fear that renewed efforts to combat the smuggling 
of migrants and refugees could affect irregular migrants’ access to their 
fundamental rights, including healthcare, education and housing.3 Several 
studies have been conducted regarding EU member states’ national 
transposition and implementation of the Facilitators’ Package,4 or more 
generally, on policies and programmes focused on smuggling across the EU 
and in cooperation with third countries and the characteristics of the 
                                                     
1 European Commission, European Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 240 final, 
13.5.2015, pp. 8 and 9. 
2 EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling (2015-2020) (COM(2015) 285). 
3 PICUM (2002), Book of Solidarity. Providing Assistance to Undocumented 
Migrants in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK, Vol. 1, PICUM, 
Brussels; PICUM (2003); Book of Solidarity. Providing Assistance to Undocumented 
Migrants in France, Spain and Italy, Vol. 2, PICUM, Brussels; and Book of Solidarity. 
Providing Assistance to Undocumented Migrants in Sweden, Denmark and Austria, 
Vol. 3, PICUM, Brussels. 
4 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), “Criminalisation of 
Migrants in an Irregular Situation and of persons engaging with them”, FRA, 
Vienna, 2014; M. Provera, “The Criminalisation of Irregular Migration in the 
European Union”, CEPS Papers on Liberty and Security in Europe, No. 80, CEPS, 
Brussels, 2015.  
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phenomenon.5 Yet a significant gap exists concerning the actual effects that 
these laws have on those working at the front line of providing humanitarian 
assistance, public services and fundamental human rights to irregular 
migrants, in particular civil society organisations and cities.  
This chapter presents the results of a study commissioned by the 
European Parliament to fill that gap. The study collated desk-based research 
mapping law and policy frameworks across several EU member states, 
available data on prosecution and conviction rates, and questionnaires 
targeting civil society organisers, service providers, cities, national 
governments and ship owners.6  
This chapter begins by outlining the humanitarian exception provision 
envisaged by the Facilitators’ Package before considering the impact that it 
has on individuals and organisations providing access to humanitarian 
assistance, public services and fundamental rights to irregular migrants on 
the ground. Several significant shortcomings in current efforts to monitor 
and measure this impact are also explored.   
The EU anti-smuggling legal framework and humanitarian 
assistance to irregular migrants: An inherently ambiguous 
relationship  
The tension between the criminalisation of people smuggling and those 
providing humanitarian assistance is a by-product of Council Directive 
2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorised 
entry, transit and residence (the Facilitation Directive)7 and the Council 
                                                     
5 See European Commission, “A Study on Smuggling of Migrants: Characteristics, 
Responses and Cooperation with Third Countries”, Final Report, September 2015 
(http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/ 
european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-studies/ 
study_on_smuggling_of_migrants_final_report_master_091115_final_pdf.pdf). 
6 See www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/536490/ 
IPOL_STU(2016)536490_EN.pdf. 
7 Council Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of 
unauthorised entry, transit and residence, OJ L 328, 5.12.2002, pp. 17-18. 
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Framework Decision8 implementing it – collectively known as the 
Facilitators’ Package.  
The EU Action Plan against Migrant Smuggling (2015-20) of May 2015 
announced that the European Commission would make proposals in 2016 to 
improve these two legal instruments. It acknowledged the need to avoid the 
criminalisation of those providing assistance to irregular migrants in 
addition to the existential risks that the Facilitators’ Package raises for 
individuals and organisations (or both) providing humanitarian assistance 
and access to fundamental human rights to migrants and refugees. These 
actors include civil society organisations, local authorities, citizens and 
residents, from an individual giving someone a lift in their car to a civil 
society organisation, religious organisation or local authority providing 
housing to a destitute migrant in need of shelter.  
The Facilitators’ Package seeks to compel EU member states to provide 
criminal sanctions for a broad set of behaviours, including the smuggling of 
people and the provision of assistance to irregular migrants in a framework 
characterised by legal ambiguity and uncertainty. Article 1.2 of the 
Facilitation Directive provides a non-binding option to EU member states to 
apply an exception to the criminalisation of that facilitation when the latter 
is “humanitarian” in nature.9 The implementation of the humanitarian 
assistance exception is therefore discretionary upon the authorities of EU 
member states. 
The nature and scope of ‘what’ humanitarian assistance actually 
involves is not defined by the Directive. Neither are the potential 
relationships between the facilitator and the irregular migrant, which may 
often include family, affective or personal relationships. In addition, the 
Directive places special emphasis on member states adopting criminal 
sanctions for facilitators of stay who act “for financial gain”,10 which in turn 
                                                     
8 Council Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA of 28 November 2002 on the 
strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised 
entry, transit and residence, OJ L 328, 5.12.2002. 
9 Article 1.2 reads as follows: “2. Any member state may decide not to impose 
sanctions with regard to the behaviour defined in paragraph 1(a) by applying its 
national law and practice for cases where the aim of the behaviour is to provide 
humanitarian assistance to the person concerned.” 
10 Article 1.1.b of the Directive stipulates that “any person who, for financial gain, 
intentionally assists a person who is not a national of a Member state to reside within 
the territory of a Member state [is] in breach of the laws of the state concerned on 
the residence of aliens”. 
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puts at greater risk of prosecution and conviction on service providers to 
irregular migrants and other members of society such as landlords. These 
legal uncertainties are exacerbated by the omission in the Facilitators’ 
Package of its relationship with relevant international and regional human 
rights instruments, which stipulate legal obligations for state parties and 
often call for the provision of assistance to those in need, not least in critical 
situations such as destitution or persons in distress at sea.  
Of particular relevance in this regard is the substantial 
‘implementation gap’ between the UN Protocol against the Smuggling of 
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (referred to as the UN Smuggling Protocol) 
and international and EU legal frameworks on people smuggling. Chiefly, 
the latter differ from the UN Protocol in three main ways: 1) the extent of the 
inclusion and definition of an element of “financial gain” in the description 
of facilitation of irregular entry, transit and stay; 2) the inclusion of an 
exemption of punishment for those providing humanitarian assistance; and 
3) the inclusion of specific safeguards for victims of smuggling. 
Inconsistencies in punishment and protection:  
Transposition of the Facilitators’ Package into national law 
As a result of the discretionary powers granted to member states in the 
implementation of the Facilitators’ Package, a survey of its transposition into 
the law of selected member states conducted by Alverti11 found significant 
variation how it is framed and implemented in the national law of selected 
member states. This includes whether facilitation is considered a civil or 
administrative crime as well as variation in wording and certain conditions 
for or protections from prosecution. While France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain and the UK all punish the facilitation of irregular entry, 
for example, only legislation in Germany requires an element of financial 
gain or profit for it to be a punishable offence. This is also the case in 
Hungary and Greece. As underlined in the previous section, while the UN 
Smuggling Protocol requires the punishment of facilitation only if done for 
profit, the Facilitators’ Package does not expressly introduce this obligation 
in the case of facilitation of irregular entry.  
                                                     
11 www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/536490/IPOL_ 
STU(2016)536490_EN.pdf. 
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The safeguard introduced in Article 1.2 of the Facilitation Directive, 
allowing member states not to impose sanctions where irregular entry and 
transit are facilitated for humanitarian purposes, has only been introduced 
by a handful of member states including Spain12 and Greece.13  
In relation to the facilitation of irregular stay, although Article 1.1.b of 
the Facilitation Directive provides that member states may refrain from 
punishing facilitation of irregular stay, if this is not done intentionally or for 
financial gain, the Directive does not impose an obligation on member states 
to refrain from punishing the facilitation of irregular stay when an element 
of intention or financial gain is absent. As a consequence, inconsistencies 
among domestic laws can be identified in relation to both the definition of 
the specific conduct to be criminalised and the requirement of an element of 
profit or financial gain for facilitation of irregular stay to be punished.  
This results in legal uncertainty and inconsistency and impacts the 
effectiveness of the legislation. 
Measuring the impact of the Facilitators’ Package: Problems 
of inconsistent monitoring and data collection  
Moreover, analysis of available statistics coupled with an in-depth analysis 
of court cases in selected countries involving the criminalisation of 
facilitation and humanitarian assistance reveals that qualitative and 
quantitative data on the prosecution and conviction rates of those who have 
provided humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants is lacking at national 
and EU level. Domestic court cases in selected EU member states offer 
anecdotal evidence that criminalisation has covered family members and 
those assisting migrants and refugees to enter. Meanwhile, domestic 
developments in Greece and Hungary suggest that these laws are being 
applied with renewed rigour14 but with minimal monitoring of direct or 
indirect impact on humanitarian assistance. In recent years there is some 
                                                     
12 Ley Orgánica 4/2000, de 11 de enero, sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros 
en España y su integración social, BOE-A-2000-544 (Organic Law 4/2000, of 11 
January, on rights and freedoms of foreigners in Spain and their social integration). 
See Article 54(3) listing “very serious infractions”: “That established in preceding 
articles notwithstanding, it shall not be considered an infraction to transport into 
Spanish territory a foreign national who, having presented without delay a request 
for asylum, has had this admitted for processing.” 
13 See the Immigration Act, Article 88(6). 
14 See, for example, Safdar (2016). 
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evidence across various member states – including the UK, Germany, 
France, the Netherlands and Spain – of the use of facilitation-related offences 
against altruistic individuals assisting others, including family members, 
members of humanitarian organisations and private individuals acting out 
of compassion. Given the limited scope and sample size on which these 
studies are based, it is nevertheless difficult to draw general conclusions on 
the operation of the exemption from them. Yet these cases are indicative of 
the wide scope for criminalisation allowed by domestic legal regimes, and 
potential deficiencies in the Facilitation Directive to prevent such expansion.  
Irrespective of the actual number of convictions and prosecutions, the 
effects of the Facilitators’ Package extend beyond formal prosecutions and 
the number of criminal convictions. It is misleading to regard a criminal 
conviction as the only index of punitiveness. Being arrested, interrogated, 
detained and prosecuted for a crime can have punitive effects on those 
subject to state intervention, even where those interventions do not 
eventually result in a conviction and the imposition of a sanction. Criminal 
and immigration statistics are unlikely to provide details on the context of 
the offence and the specific reasons for the discontinuation of proceedings, 
including the application of any exemption to liability.   
In terms of methodological issues, while some member states collect 
data on the number of individuals apprehended, prosecuted and convicted 
for facilitation-related offences, some of them do not make this information 
publicly available. Others, like Italy, do not provide a breakdown of 
immigration offences by offence type. There are also discrepancies in terms 
of the years for which the information is available. As a result, meaningful 
comparisons across jurisdictions are difficult to draw.  
As it currently stands, we know that the Facilitators’ Package has been 
interpreted in a number of ways in the law of member states. Yet there is 
scarce and patchy evidence – both qualitative and quantitative – on both 
variations and consistencies in its day-to-day implementation and the 
impact this has on humanitarian actors.  
Material and perceived effects of the Facilitators’ Package: 
The view from the grass roots 
The results of a questionnaire of 69 civil society organisations and 13 cities 
across approximately 20 member states give us some indication of the range 
of material and direct and perceived effects of the Facilitators’ Package on 
irregular migrants and the individuals and organisations providing 
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humanitarian assistance to them. The data also reflect a number of additional 
unintended or indirect consequences. 
Some civil society organisations fear sanction and experience 
intimidation in their work with irregular migrants, with a deterrent effect on 
their work. Almost all consider their work to be humanitarian in nature: 
claiming to provide services that help migrants to access their fundamental 
rights (including to heath care, shelter, hygiene and legal assistance) and to 
live with dignity as fellow human beings. 
A fifth of civil society respondents reported that their organisation or 
a member of their organisation has feared sanction for their work assisting 
an irregular migrant as a consequence of anti-smuggling legislation – both 
for work related to the transit of migrants and for supporting them during 
their stay in a member state. Among these were respondents from Spain, the 
UK, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Austria and Hungary. Actual cases of 
criminal sanction nevertheless appear rare. Just a handful of respondents to 
the civil society survey reported direct experience of proceedings, 
prosecution or sanction for their work supporting irregular migrants. 
Criminal acts included fundraising for the medical bill of a migrant domestic 
worker without licence, protesting, and misuse of public funds.  
Those assisting irregular migrants perceive significant room for 
manoeuvre and a degree of arbitrariness in the way the Facilitation Directive 
is implemented in their member state, and there is also widespread 
confusion among civil society practitioners concerning how the Facilitation 
Directive should be implemented in their member state. This can lead to 
misinformation and ‘erring on the side of caution’, thereby compromising 
migrants’ access to vital services. This is especially true in the context of the 
significant increase in the number of people migrating to Europe and seeking 
asylum, where everyday citizens are obliged to volunteer vital services in the 
absence of sufficient state provision. Previous studies have demonstrated 
that fear of sanction can have a deterrent effect, contributing to what Basaran 
(2015) calls, in the context of humanitarian rescue at sea, a “collective 
indifference”. While there is no evidence of indifference in our survey of 
shipowners, there is widespread concern that member states are failing to 
adequately support them. This lack of support has the effect of putting the 
lives of crew members and migrants at risk, and of harming relations of 
social trust between shipowners and member states. 
A lack of coordination between local and national authorities 
regarding the implementation of the Facilitation Directive impinges on the 
key role played by civil society organisations and cities in ensuring irregular 
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migrants’ access to humanitarian assistance and basic services. Recent legal 
action led by the city of Utrecht demonstrates how cities may employ legal 
strategies to try to force the state to provide clearer instructions and 
resources to local authorities for the upholding of irregular migrants’ 
fundamental rights. The city of Utrecht decided to provide shelter to 
irregular migrants – in breach of national law – when the situation of 
homeless people squatting just outside of the city became unacceptable. 
Municipal authorities decided to provide a response to this situation both to 
meet the need for public order and security but also for humanitarian 
reasons.  
The Facilitators’ Package has indirect repercussions not just for 
irregular migrants and those assisting them, but also for citizens, and for the 
social trust and social cohesion of the receiving society as a whole. In certain 
member states, the implementation of the Facilitation Directive is perceived 
as contributing to the social exclusion of both irregular and regular migrants 
and undermining social trust. Ship owners report that they feel poorly 
supported by member states and are ill-placed to help irregular migrants at 
sea. Our research shows that criminalisation of assistance feeds a general 
climate of fear and insecurity about irregular immigration. The main 
concerns of practitioners continue to be how to deliver their assistance tasks 
and responsibilities without being penalised, and how to avoid social 
exclusion, maintain social cohesion and cater to the needs of all these 
populations. Criminalisation also jeopardises the ‘citizen’s right to assist’ 
those in need of humanitarian aid as a key function of democracy.  
Conclusions 
There is no question that Facilitators’ Package raises a number of important 
questions at the level of implementation, and this has led some to claim that 
it is not fit for purpose. There is, however, a lack of on-the-ground 
information about the multi-layered effects of the practical implementation 
of the Facilitation Directive on irregular migrants and those providing 
assistance to them. The chapter has argued that, irrespective of quantitative 
evidence (actual numbers of convictions and prosecutions), the most far-
reaching effects of the Facilitators’ Package may well extend beyond formal 
prosecutions and criminal convictions. These mainly relate to the direct, 
perceived and unintended consequences characterising the implementation 
of the Facilitators’ Package for those providing on-the-ground humanitarian 
assistance and services or other organisations and individuals in society. In 
conclusion, two key recommendations can be formulated.  
90  ALLSOPP & MANIERI 
 
Firstly, if the Facilitation Directive is to mandate the criminalisation of 
certain forms of facilitation of entry, transit and residence, those forms of 
facilitation should be sufficiently specified in order to minimise the scope for 
expansive interpretation at the domestic level. In addition, it should be made 
clear that not-for-profit, humanitarian facilitation of entry, transit and/or 
residence is not to be subject to criminal or administrative liability. The main 
interest protected by the offence should be the life, security and physical 
integrity of the person assisted. As such, obvious candidates for 
criminalisation are acts that cause serious injuries, endanger life or result in 
the death of another person, as well as acts committed by organised criminal 
groups. A major concern should be the effects, for both migrants and those 
who help them, of criminalisation processes coupled with a lack of regular 
channels for migrants to reach Europe, in terms of increasing the risks of 
border crossings and the demand for smugglers.  
Secondly, member states should be obliged to put in place adequate 
systems to monitor and independently evaluate the enforcement of the 
Facilitators’ Package, and allow for quantitative and qualitative assessment 
of its implementation when it comes to the number of prosecutions and 
convictions, as well as to their effects. Without comprehensive, robust and 
comparable evidence on the impact of the Facilitation Directive in domestic 
jurisdictions, it is difficult to assess the practical effectiveness of the EU law. 
The work of humanitarian actors ought to be protected and recognised 
as a necessary social good to be protected from sanction and intimidation at 
all times. This norm is already recognised in certain international normative 
instruments, such as the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders of 
1999. One civil society survey respondent makes the importance of this work 
clear: not only do they help migrants to access their fundamental rights; in 
so doing, they actually help protect them from potential abuse, including 
from future smuggling or exploitation.  
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ANNEX. PROGRAMME OF THE 
EXPERT FIDUCIA SEMINAR 
Tuesday, 24 March 2015 
13.00 – 13.30: Registration and Buffet Lunch 
13.30 – 14.00: WELCOME AND OPENING 
 Sergio Carrera (CEPS) 
 Dana Spinant, DG Home, European Commission 
 Katarzyna Cuadrat-Grzybowska, DG Home, European Commission 
14.00 – 16.00: CHALLENGE I: The criminalisation of facilitating irregular 
entry and stay  
The Facilitation Directive and the Employer Sanctions Directive subjects those 
facilitating irregular entry, stay and employment to criminal measures. This panel 
addresses the role of such measures in migration management and identifies the 
issues and challenges arising from their application.  
Chair: Michele LeVoy, PICUM 
 Sarah Spencer, University of Oxford 
 Alessandro Spena, Università degli Studi di Palermo 
 Arjen Leerkes, Erasmus University Rotterdam 
 Michael Collyer, University of Sussex 
Open Discussion 
16.00 – 16.15: Coffee Break 
16.15 – 18.15: CHALLENGE II: Humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants 
As social networks play an increasingly prominent role in assisting irregular 
migrants accessing their fundamental rights, ambiguity exists about the extent of 
assistance individuals and organisations can lawfully provide. In light of the 
reconsideration of the Facilitation Directive, this panel examines the effect of these 
policies and the priorities at the EU level.  
Chair: Annica Ryngbeck, Social Platform 
 Mark Provera, CEPS (FIDUCIA Project partner)  
 Ana Aliverti, University of Warwick 
 Jennifer Allsopp, University of Oxford 
Open Discussion 
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Wednesday, 25 March 2015 
8.30 – 9.00: Coffee 
9.00 – 11.00: CHALLENGE III: The interrelationship of trafficking in 
human beings with other forms of irregular migration 
Identifying victims and prosecuting perpetrators of human trafficking remains an 
ongoing challenge in the EU. This panel examines the priorities for the EU in 
addressing trafficking in human beings and explores its interrelationship with other 
forms of irregular migration.   
Chair: Sergio Carrera, CEPS 
 Anniina Jokinen, European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, 
affiliated with the United Nations (FIDUCIA Project partner) 
 Rutvica Andrijasevic, University of Bristol 
 Julia Muraszkiewicz, Vrije Universiteit Brussel 
 Angeliki Dimitriadi, ELIAMEP 
Open Discussion 
11.00 – 11.15: Coffee Break 
11.15 – 13.15: THE WAY FORWARD: Policy Recommendations for the new 
EU Migration Agenda 
As the European Commission prepares its EU Agenda on Migration, this panel of 
academics will suggest recommendations for future EU legislative and policy 
measures to contribute to the European Commission’s work on these three inter-
related areas.  
Chair: Thomas Huddleston, MPG 
 Sergio Carrera, CEPS 
 Kees Groenendijk, Radboud University Nijmegen 
 Elisa Brey, Universidad Complutense de Madrid 
13.15 – 14.00: Light Lunch 
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E-mail : info@ceps.eu
Website : www.ceps.eu IR
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Edited by
Sergio Carrera
Elspeth Guild
Irregular Migration,  
Trafficking and  
smuggling of human beings
Policy Dilemmas in the EU
This book examines the treatment of irregular migration, 
trafficking and smuggling of human beings in EU law and 
policy. What are the policy dilemmas encountered in efforts to 
criminalise irregular migration and humanitarian assistance to 
irregular immigrants ? The various contributions in this edited 
volume examine the principal considerations that make up EU 
policies directed towards irregular migration and its relationship 
with trafficking and smuggling of human beings. This book aims 
to provide academic input to informed policy-making in the next 
phase of the European Agenda on Migration.
